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THE SOCIAL SETTING OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE PROCESS




The existence in fact of a world community, in the sense of the long-term
interdetermination of all individuals with regard to all values, is today commonly
recognized. This larger community of humankind may be observed to comprise a
whole hierarchy of interpenetrating lesser communities, of many different sizes
and characteristics, with the larger communities affecting the lesser communities
contained within them and the lesser communities, in turn, affecting the larger
communities which they compose. In the comprehensive social process which
transcends all these different communities, individual human beings, affected by
constantly changing environmental and predispositional factors, are continuosly
engaged in the shaping and sharing of all values, with achievement of many
different outcomes in deprivation and fulfillment. It is these outcomes in
deprivation and fulfillment in the shaping and sharing of values which constitute,
in an empirical and policy-oriented conception, the human rights which the
larger community of humankind protects or fails to protect.
The first indispensable step in relevant and effective inquiry must be that of
creating a map or model of world social process, as the larger context of human
rights, which will permit empirical reference to human rights problems in
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whatever degrees of comprehensiveness and precision that performance of the
necessary intellectual tasks may require. It is this most comprehensive social
process which affects, not merely degrees in the achievement of human rights,
but also the kinds of claims that are made to authoritative decision for redress of
deprivations and non-fulfillments, as well as the responding outcomes in
decision. With a map of world social process, which both exhibits broad outlines
and points to relevant detail, a scholarly observer may be able to formulate the
claims which participants make to authoritative decision in factual terms of
discrepancy between community aspiration and achievement and, hence, to
facilitate comparisons in flows of authoritative decisions through time and across
community boundaries.
The map of comprehensive worlo social process we recommend, in
expansion of the generalized image of "man" striving to maximize "values" by
applying "institutions" to "resources", includes, as previously noted, a number
of distinguishable, but interrelated, features:
(1) Participation.
Individual and group actors.
(2) Perspectives.
The subjectivities of the actors that give direction and intelligibility to
interaction.
(3) Situations.
The geographic, temporal, institutional, and crisis features of interaction.
(4) Base values.
The values and resources (potential values) available to different actors in
shaping interactions.
(5) Strategies.
The modalities employed in managing base values.
(6) Outcomes.
The shapings and sharings of values achieved. 1
In more detailed exposition of the reference and potential significance of
1 For exposition of thc theoretical system see H. Lasswell & A. Kaplan, Power and
Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry (1950). For preliminary applications of the
theory in various fields, see, for instance, R. Arens & H. Lasswell, In Defense of Public
Order: The Emerging Field of Sanction Law (1961); L. Chen & H. Lasswell, Formosa,
China, and the United Nations (1967); M. McDougal & W. Burke, The Public Order of the
Oceans: A Contemporary International Law of the Sea (1962); M. McDougal & F. Feliciano,
Law and Ainimum World Public Order: The Legal Regulation of International Coercion
(1961); M. McDougal, H. Lasswell, & J. Miller, The Interpretation of Agreements and World
Public Order: Principles of Content and Procedure (1967); M. McDougal, H. Lasswell, & 1.
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these features, we emphasize items that may especially effect deprivations and
non-fulfillments in the achievement of values.
I. Participants
The principal participants in the world social process, in which human rights
are both deprived and fulfilled, are individual human beings with all their many
different group identifications. Individual human beings are the ultimate actors
in any social process; but they affiliate, voluntarily or involuntarily, with many
different groups (both territorial and functional) and act through the form of, or
play roles in, organizations of the greatest variety, including not only
nation-states but also international governmental organizations, political parties,
pressure groups, and private associations of all kinds. Individuals operate through
all these groups in many different interacting circles (which may or may not
overlap each other), playing multiple roles under dynamically changing
circumstances, either in their own behalf or on behalf of groups, and increasingly
with transnational consequences. 2 Aside from prominent figures who make
headlines, millions and millions of human beings daily make their own choices
regarding participation in different value processes, travel beyond particular
territorial communities, and communicate and collaborate, transnationally as
well as nationally, in pursuit of all values.
The individual human being, as the basic actor in all interactions, is always
potentially both a deprivor and a deprivee of human rights. The extent to which
particular individuals become deprivors\ or deprivees relates importantly to the
broader features of the context: the roles they play (governmental or private),
the perspectives they entertain (human-dignity or anti-human-dignity), the
Vlasic, The Public Order of Space (1963); B. Murty, Propaganda and World Public Order:
The Legal Regulation of the Ideological Instrument of Coercion (1968); W. Reisman,
Nullity and Revision (1971); Toward World Order and Human Dignity: Essays in Honor of
Myres S. McDougal (W. Reisman & B. Weston eds. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Toward World
Order and H!uman Dignity]; A. Rogow & H. Lasswell, Power, Corruption, and Rectitude
(1963).
For comparable maps by other social scientists, see Political Development and Change:
A Policy Approach (G. Brewer & R. Brunner eds. 1975); A. Etzioni, The Active Society: A
Theory of Societal and Political Processes (1968); J. Galtung, Theory and Methods of
Society Research (1967); P. Kelvin, The Basis of Social Behaviour (1970); R. Merton,
Social Theory and Social Structure (3d ed. 1968); R. Nisbet, The Social Bond: An Intro-
duction to the Study of Society (1970); G. Mead, Mind, Self and Society (C. Morris ed.
1943); T. Parsons, The Social System (1951): N. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior
(1971).
2 For the many roles individuals play in everyday life, see the brilliant works by
Erving Goffman, including: E. Goffman, Encounters (1961); E. Goffman, The Presentation
of Self in Everyday Life (1959). See also P. Kelvin, supra note 1, at 139-67; R. Nisbet, supra
note 1, at 148-80.
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situational dynamics (crisis or non-crisis), the authority and other base values at
their disposal (concentrated or non-concentrated), and the strategies employable
(persuasive or coercive). With the vast increases in population described above,
the number of people with the predispositions and capabilities to impose
deprivations has increased enormously with cumulating tension and conflict in
human relations. 3 Similarly, as more and more individuals become available as
targets, the number of people who in fact sustain deprivations and cannot secure
fulfillment of important values has significantly multiplied.
Because of an enormous diversity in both cultural environment and
biological endowment, individuals exhibit a comparable diversity in the detailed
patterns of activities by which they pursue different cherished values. While this
diversity undoubtedly enriches the quality of life and culture, it has simultane-
ously contributed to the present state of deprivation and non-fulfillment of
values. Consider, for example, the various grounds in the name of which
discriminatory deprivations are commonly imposed, including: biological charac-
teristics (race, sex, age), culture (nationality), class (in reference to wealth,
power, respect, rectitude, and all other values), interest (group memberships),
and personality. 4
The groups which individuals create in the pursuit of values, like the
individuals themselves, today proliferate in great abundance. Group interactions
are those in which individuals identify in the pursuit of collective activities with
other persons and concurrently establish relatively stable patterns of subjectivity
and operation. The interaction between one individual and another typically
3 See McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order: Human
Rights in Comprehensive Context, 72 Nw. U.L. Rev. 227 (1977).
4 See McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, The Protection of Respect and Human Rights:
Freedom of Choice and World Public Order, 24 Am. U. L. Rev. 919, 1034-86 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as The Protection of Respect]; McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, Human
Rights for Women and World Public'Order: The Outlawing of Sex-Based Discrimination, 69
Am. J. Int'l L. 497 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Human Rights for Women]; McDougal,
Lasswell, & Chen, 7he Right to Religious Freedom and World Public Order: The Emerging
Norm of Non-Discrimination, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 865 (1976); McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen,
Non-Conforming Political Opinion and Human Rights: Transnational Protection against
Discrimination, 2 Yale Studies in World Public Order 1 (1975); NcDougal, Lasswell, &
Chen, Freedom from Discrimination in Choice of Language and International Human
Rights, 1976 So. IlL U. L. J. 151 (1976): McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, The Protection of
Aliens from Discrimination and World Public Order: Responsibility of States Conjoined
with Human Rights, 70 Am. J. Int'l L. 432 (1976); McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, The
Human Rights of the Aged: An Application of the GeneralNorm of Non-Discrimination, 28
U. Fla. L. Rev. 639 (1976).
See also The Fourth World: the Imprisoned, the Poor, the Sick, the Elderly and
Underaged in America (L. Hamlian & F. Karl eds. 1976); P. Van den Berghe, Man in Society:
A Biosocial View 93-124 (1975); 1 & 2 Case Studies on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms: A World Survey (W. Veenhoven ed. 1975); L. Vierdag, The Concept of Dis-
crimination in International Law (1973); The Fourth World: Victims of Group Oppression
(B. Whitaker ed. 1973).
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results in value indulgence and deprivation. Viewed in the perspective of group
to group interaction-which is typically a multi-individual to multi-individual
phenomenon-the results are both value indulgent and value deprivational.
5
Organized Groups
The significant groups in the world context are organized and unorganized
(or partially organized). The organized groups are conspicuous in the processes
specialized to government, law and politics (political power) because the
organizations involved include all the members and are comparatively easy to
identify as participants. The unorganized groups do not completely coincide
with persons who share the common characteristics that define the groups.
We employ five categories of organized groups whose interactions of value
indulgence and deprivation can be described in detail. We identify nation-states.
international governmental organizations, political parties, pressure groups, and
private organizations. In addition, we single out terror groups and gangs for
special attention.
Nation-states
In a territorially organized world, the nation-state remains, despite the
growing roles of other groups, a dominant participant in the shaping and sharing
of all values. The kinds and magnitudes of deprivations and non-fulfillments of
human rights to which individuals are today subjected are largely determined by
the nation-states of which they are members. Subject to certain reservations to
be specified as we proceed, the degree to which demands for human dignity
values are fulfilled is still largely dependent upon the performance of
governmental functions within territorially organized communities.
In spite of the myth of formal equality, the nation-states of the world are
far from congruent with one another. Nation-states vary tremendously in terms
of size, population (number and composition), resources, complex matrix of
institutions, and stages of development measured by science and technology.
6 It
5 On group interaction, see R. Bales, Interaction Process Analysis: A Method for the
Study of Small Groups (1952); C. Cooley, Social Organization: A Stud), of" the Larger Mind
(1909); G. Homans, The Human Group (1964); Group Relations and Group Antagonisms
(R. Maclver ed. 1944); E. Malecki & H. Mahood, Group Politics (1972); M. Olson. The
Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (rev. ed. 197 1); G.
Simmel, The Sociology of George Simmel (K. Wolff ed. & transl. 1950); S. Stoljar, Groups
and Entities: An Inquiry into Corporate Theory (1973).
For convenient summaries of various group theories, see Greenstone, Group Theories,
in 2 Handbook of Political Science 243-318 (F. Greenstein & N. Polsby eds. 1975); Homans
& others, Groups, 6 Int'l Encyc. Soc. Sc. 259 (1968).
6 See B. Russett, et al., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators 293-303
(1964), for quantitative comparison.
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is noteworthy that political boundaries are far from congruous with ethnic,
linguistic, cultural, religious and other boundaries. 7 In terms of the public order
system demanded and projected, particularly in the structure of power shaping
and sharing, states differ profoundly in characteristics that range from
totalitarian or authoritarian to the patterns of democracy.
At the end of World War I a rapid proliferation of nation states occurred as
the ancient Empires of Europe divided their continental domains. World War II
initiated a fantastically accelerated process which was mainly characterized by
the break-up of extra-European Empires. 8 At the same time the numerous
demands to bring into effective being a transnational network of effective
cooperation fell far short of the dreams and challenges of the world political
arena. Failing to achieve sufficient agreement on common purposes, nation-
states, like private groups, often give expression to special interests. The massive
transformation of ex-colonies into independent states has typically failed to
combine nationalism, democracy and development into coherent and effective
programs. 9 The world community is sensitized to generation of "petty
tyrants", who are determined to hold on to power at all cost.' 0 Sheltered
7 See L. Doob, Comiunication in Africa: A Search for Boundaries (196 l);EthnicitY.
Theory and Experience (N. Glazer & D. Moynihan eds. 1975) [hereinafter cited as
Ethnicity]; Claydon, The Transnational Protection of Ethnic Minorities: A Tentative Frame-
work for Inquiry, 13 Canadian Y.B. Int'l L. 25 (1975); Connor, Ethnology and the Peace of
South Asia, 22 World Politics 51 (1969); Connor, Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?,
24 World Politics 319 (1972): Connor, The Politics of Ethnonationalism, 27 J. Int'l Affairs
1 (1973); Possony, Nationalism and the Ethnic Factor, 10 Orbis 1218 (1967); Hughes, The
Real Boundaries in Africa Are Ethnic, Not Lines on a Map, N. Y Tines, June 15, 1975, Sec.
4, at 4, col. 4.
8 See Chen, Self-Determination as a Human Right, in Toward World Order and Human
Dignity, supra note 1, at 198-261. See also A. Cobban, The Nation State and National
Self-Determination (1969); R. Emerson, From Empire to Nation (1960); R. Emerson, Self
Determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonization (Occasional Paper No. 9, Harvard
University Center for International Affairs, 1964); D. Gordon, Self-Determination and
History in the Third World (197 1); H. Johnson, Self-Determination within the Community
of Nations (1967); A. Sureda, The Evolution of the Right of Self-Determination (1973); U.
Umozurike, Self-Determination in International Law (1972).
9 For difficulties associated with contemporary nation-building, see D. Apter, The
Politics of Modernization (1965); L. Binder, et al., Crises and Sequences in Political
Development (1971) (Other contributers are: James S. Coleman, Joseph LaPalombara,
Lucian W. Pye, Sidney Verba, and Myron Weiner); C. Black, The Dynamics of Modern-
ization (1966); S. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (1968); A. Inkeles & D.
Smith, Becomihg Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries (1974); D. Lerner,
The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (1963); M. Levy,
Modernization and the Structure of Society: A Setting for International Affairs (1966);
Lasswell, The Policy Sciences of Development, 17 World Politics 286 (1965).
10 See e.g., Hills, Amin Is a Tyrant, but Not without Admires, N. Y. Times, July 11.
1976, Sec. 4, at 3, col. 3; Sulzberger, No Antidote to 'Big Daddy, id., June 29, 1975, Sec.
4, at 15, col. 2; Africa Can't Afford Him, id, July 12, 1975, at 24, col. 1 (editorial); id.,
July 1-0, 1976, at 3, col. 1; id, Oct. 5, 1975, Sec. 1, at 2, col. 3 (Ambassador Daniel
Moynihan's criticism of Amin).
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behind the relative indifference of many elements in the outside world, local
rulers have given effect to measures of deprivation and non-fulfillment.
Parallel tendencies have made their presence felt in the older nation-
states, some of which were commonly assumed to be insulated from the impact
of factors that undermine authority and control. The growing role of
government in society, which has frequently gone hand in hand with the
centralization of power and the concentration of effective decision making in a
few hands, has often led to bureaucratic rigidity and regimentation, corruption
and loss of confidence in the body politic. 1
International governmental organizations
Under the pressures generated by interdependence, nation-states have found
it expedient to organize a network of transnational intergovernmental structure
to accomplish a range of specific objectives. Being creatures of nation-states,
these organizations are generally handicapped in activities relating to human
rights by the acute concern of the most influential elements in particular nation-
states to avoid either a formal or an effective loss of power. Though formal
competence for the promotion or protection of human rights may be conferred
upon those organizations, their actual capacity for furthering value fulfillment is
commonly curtailed by the limited resources made available to them. 12
The disappointing developments to which brief allusion has been made are
especially painful to the large number of articulate spokesmen of human interest
values in the non-totalitarian or ex-colonial powers who cooperated to achieve
international or local treaties and statutes that put into authoritative language
the aspirations of many generations of humanizing and revolutionary politicians
See also Uganda: Amin vs. the World, Newsweek, Aug. 9, 1976, at 35-36;N. Y. Times,
Dec. 5, 1976, Sec. 1, at 15, col. 1 (city ed.) (the transformation of the Central African
Republic to the Central African Empire and of Salah Eddine Ahmed Bokassa from president
for life to Emperor Bokassa I).
11 See M. Halperin, et al., The Lawless State: The Crime of the U.S. Intelligence
Agencies (1976); J. Lieberman, How the Government Breaks the Law (1972); D. Wise, The
Politics of Lying: Government Deception, Secrecy, and Power (1973); A. Wolfe, The Seamy
Side of Democracy: Repression in America (1973).
12 The 1972 budget of the United Nations was $213 million. N.Y. Times, Dec. 2,
1972, at 13, col. 4. In U.N. circles, the U.N. budget is compared to that of the Fire
Department of New York City. According to Professor Karl W. Deutsch's estimate, as based
on data in B. Russett, supra note 6, at 56-68, the total governmental expenditures
(governments at all levels- national, state or provincial, and local) of nation-states are
between approximately one-quarter and one-third of the GNP of the non-Communist
countries. On the other hand, the total expenditures of all the international organizations
are roughly one percent of the GNP of these same countries. Deutsch, The Probability of
International Law, in The Relevance of International Law 60 (K. Deutsch & S. Hoffmann
eds. 1968).
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and lawyers. The Charter of the United Nations (and the many accompanying
declarations and conventions about human rights) are the most influential,
conspicuous and therefore the most important sources of hope, action, and
partial disappointment.
1 3
As we shall have occasion to demonstrate, the turbulence, confusion and
conflict connected with human rights have created a state of affairs that
multiplies participants in the world (including local) processes of politics that are
more dynamic than ever before as factors in issues pertaining to human dignity.
Whatever the words of authority that authorize action on behalf of human
rights, the somber story is that, so far, the resources of manpower, facilities and
support have been insufficient to take advantage of the growing complexities of
the situation.
Political Parties
The world situation relevant to human dignity is affected by the positive,
negative or indifferent roles played by political parties that cooperate or
coordinate across national lines. 14 In totalitarian states that share the tradition
of international socialism the language of the constitution is consonant with the
doctrines and procedures of human rights. When the actual situation in the
society is investigated, however, it is far from obvious that the prescriptive
norms are put into effect. Underground political parties include organizations
that protest as vigorously as they can under the circumstances against the
contradictions between proclamation and practice. However, it is not to be
taken for granted that every vestige has disappeared of sociopolitical orders that
were pushed aside by revolutionary programs that championed the cause of
13 Relevant human rights prescriptions arc conveniently collected in Basic Documents
on Human Rights (. Brownlic cd. 1971); Basic Documents on International Protection of
Human Rights (L. Sohn & T. Buergenthal cds. 1973); Unitcd Nations, Human Rights: A
Compilation of* International Instruments of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/I
(1973).
14 See generally W. Chamber;, Political Parties in a New Nation (1963); R. Dahl,
Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (1966); Regimes and Oppositions (R. Dahl ed.
1973): M. I)uvcrgcr. Political Parties (1954); V. Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups
(5th ed. 1964): Political Parties and Political Development (J. LaPalombara & M. Weincr
eds. 1966): 1-. Lasswcll & A. Kaplan, supra note 1, at 169-73; D. MacRae, Parliament
Parties, and Societ' in France, 1946-1958 (1967): S. Neuman, Modern Political Parties
(1956): J. Salnma & F. Sontag, Parties: The Real Opportunity for Effective Citizen Politics
(1972): 'pstcin, Political Parties, in 4 Handbook of Political Science 229-77 (F. Greenstein
& N. I'olsby cds. 1975).
See also Laqueur, Eurocommunism and Its Friends, 62 Commentary 25 (Aug. 1976);
Seligman, Conmnunismis Crisis of Authority, Fortune, Feb. 1976, at 92-95 et seq.: Sellinan,
Communists in Democratic Clothing, Fortune, March 1976, at 116-19 et seq.: Birnbaum,
The New :uropean Socialism, . Y. Times, May 15, 1976, at 25, col. 2 (city ed.):Gordon,
Changes in Cbmmnunist Parties in Developed Capitalist Nations, N. Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1976,
Sec. 4, at 17, col. 1.
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human dignity. Underground movements continue in the hope of reinstating as
much as possible of previous systems. These residual fragments make common
cause with one another, and with the reactionary elites of the world arena. These
party programs may speak in the name of ancient programs of caste and class,
and of value and religion. On the whole, however, it is correct to affirm that
political parties are more heavily weighted in favor than in opposition to human
rights.
It is worth taking note of a distinction that can usefully be made between
genuine political parties and monopoly organizations that may be called political
parties. The latter are more properly known as political orders. Political parties
are institutions that evolved in arenas where organized participation in the
decision process of the nation-state is relatively open.
Pressure Groups
Unlike political parties many organizations concentrate on a single demand
rather than upon comprehensive programs of public order. Socialism or
liberalism, for instance, is translated into inclusive conceptions of governmental
structure and function by political parties. Pressure groups concentrate on
particular details, such as the abolition of slavery, the graduated income tax,
women's suffrage, free public education, and so on through scores of
proposals. 1 5 Almost every measure that has a recognized relation to human
dignity has been, or is currently, a target of pressure group action. Sometimes
the political system permits a "one-issue group" to call itself a political party
and to nominate candidates. Strictly speaking the "conventional" labels are
misleading. In a functional sense, these are pressure groups.
It is not to be overlooked that pressure groups, like political parties, may
operate on all sides of an issue. We are not surprised to find that collective action
is directed against as well as for human rights. In practice the true orientation of
15 See J. Lador-Lederer. International Group Protection 373-417 (1968): L. White.
International Non-Governmental Organizations (1951): htercst t(ro:1qs in International
Perspective, 413 The Annals 1 (May 1974); Non-Governmental Organizations (Report of the
Secretary-General). U.N. Doc. '/4476 (1968).
See more generally C. Astiz, Pressure Groups and Power Elites in Peruvian Politics
(1969): H. Eckstein, Pressure Group Politics: The Case of the British Medical Association
(1960): Interest Groups on Four Continents (H. Elhrmann ed. 1958): A. Holtzman. Interest
Groups and Lobbying (1966): V. Key, supra note 14: Private Government: Introductory
Readings (S. Lakoff ed. 1973): J. LaPalombara, Interest Groups ini Italian Politics (1964): G.
McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy (1966); Voluntary Associations (J.
Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1969); H. Ziegler & G. Peak, Interest Groups in Ammerican,
Society (2d ed. 1972); Pressure and Interest Groups, in Comparative Politics 388-430 (H.
ickstein & D. Apter eds. 1963) (articles by Almond, lckstein, and LaPalombara);
Salisbury, Interest Groups, 4 Handbook of Political Science 171-228 (F. Greenstein & N.
Polsby eds. 1975).
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a group may be disguised by the rhetoric of "liberalism," "moderation" or
"progressivism."
Private Associations
A comprehensive inventory of organizations with transnational impact
quickly establishes the fact that political power is only one of the value-
outcomes that is chiefly pursued by private or mixed public and private
associations. Nation states, political parties and pressure groups emphasize
power. Yet it is apparent that their distinctive accent on political power in no
way implies that their impacts on enlightenment, wealth, or any other
value-institution sector is trivial. The same pattern is present in associations that
are primarily private (in the civic order). Scientific societies, both local and
transnational, are distinctively aimed at the cultivation and dissemination of
knowledge. At the same time it is perceived that they require funds and
manpower to get on with their goals; and that they contribute to the economy
of the territories where they are based.
The point is especially evident when we consider the multinational
corporations, i.e., those transnational corporations and associations that fre-
quently operate in finance, transportation, communication, mining, fishing,
agriculture, manufacturing, wholesaling and retailing, and in other branches of
economic life. They employ a wide variety of modern technologies, in activities
ranging from production and marketing to financing and management. Thanks
to these new technological developments, new management techniques and the
transnational network of communication and transportation, multinational
corporations have grown in number, size, activities, and importance. As they
operate across many state boundaries, multinational corporations serve as a
global vehicle for the transfer and dissemination of capital and skill, as well as of
technology. They have greatly contributed to the internationalization of
production, finance and ownership, and to the growing integration of national
economies into a world economy. 
1 6
16 The increasing attention accorded the roles of multinational corporations is clearly
demonstrated by the rapid proliferation of literature. See The Multinational Corporation
and Social Change (D. Apter & L. Goodman eds. 1976): Global Companies: 7he Political
Econony of' World Business (G. Ball ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Global Companies]:
World Business: Promise and Problems (C. Brown ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as World
Business]; The Multinational Enterprise (J. Dunning ed. 1971); N. Fatemi, G. Williams, & T.
Dc Saint-l'hallc, Multinational Corporations (2d ed. 1976); B. Ganguli, Multinational
Corporations (1974); International Labour Office, Multinational Enterprises and Social
Polic' (1973); The Multinational Corporation (C. Kindleberger ed. 1970); F. Kolde, The
Multinational Company (1974); J. Stopford & L. Wells, Managing the Multinational
Enterprise (1972): C. Tugendhat, The Multinationals (1972); L. Tunier, Multinational
Companies and the Third World (1973); United Nations, Department of Economic and
Social Affairs, The Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on
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Multinational corporations, since they may possess more resources than
many nation-states, have sometimes been seen as posing threats to nation-
states. 1 7 Their actual and potential impact on deprivations and non-fulfillment
in the shaping and sharing of values has provoked increasing alarm. Multinational
corporations, profit-oriented as they have to be, are variously perceived as
exploiters of the labor and physical resources of the developing countries,
practitioners of corrupt business practices, environmental polluters, manipula-
tors of currencies and commodities, tax dodgers, instruments of their national
governments, and supporters of reactionary regimes.1 8 In recent times they have
International Relations, U.N. Doc. E/5500/Rev. 1 (ST/ESA/6) (1974) [lierci.aafter cited as
The Impact]: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Alultinational
Corporations in World Development, U.N. Doc. ST/I-CA/190 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Multinational Corporations in World Development]: United Nations, Department of Eco-
nomic and Social Affairs, Summary of the Hearings Befbre the Group of Eminent Persons to
Study the Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on International
Relations, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/15 (1974); R. Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational
Spread of United States Enterprises (1971): Seidl-Hohenveldern, Multinational Enterprises
and the International Law of the Future, [1975] Y.B. World Affairs 301 : Cary, Multinational
Corporations as Development Partners, N. Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1975, at 27, col. 2 (city ed.)
[1975] Y.B. World Affairs 301: Cary, Multinational Corporations as Development Partners,
N. Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1975, at 27, col. 2 (city ed.).
17 Starting from the assumption that "The men who nin the global corporations are
the first in history with the organization, technology, money, and ideology to make a
credible try at managing the world as an integrated unit," Barnet and Muller argue that "the
goal of corporate diplomacy is nothing less than the replacement of national loyalty with
corporate loyalty. If they are to succeed in integrating the planet. loyalty to the global
enterprise must take precedence over all other political loyalties." R. Barnet & R. Muller,
Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corporations 13. 89 (1974). [:or detail, see
id. at 72-104.
Raymond Vernon dramatizes the threat of the multinational enterprises in these
words:
Suddenly, it seems, the sovereign states are feeling naked. Concepts such as national
sovereignty and national economic strength appear curiously drained of meaning.
R. Vernon, supra note 16, at 3.
See also J. Behrman, National Interests and the International Enterprise: Tensions
Among the North Atlantic Countries (1970); The Nation-State and Transactional
Corporation in Conflict, with Special Reference to Latin America (J. Gunnemann ed.
1975); T. Moran, Multinational Corporations auid the Politics of Dependence: Copper in
Chile (1974); Ball, Introduction, in Global Companies, supra note 16, :it 1-2; Behrman,
Multination Corporations and National Sovereignty, in World Business. supra note 16, at
114-25; Barnet & Muller, Planet Earth, a Wholly-Owned Subsidiary, N. Y. Times, Jan. 23,
1975, at 33, col. 1 (city ed.).
18 See R. Barnet & R. Muller, supra note 17, at 123-84, 278-83, 334-62. l-or a case
study, see A. Sampson, The Sovereign State of ITT (1973).
As Katzenbach points out, "[tihe earlier literature tended to regard the so-called
multinational corporation as a new form of internationalism which would have beneficent
results in terms of rationalizing the world economic order irrespective of political
boundaries, of transferring technology from the haves to the have-nots, and being a sort of
great engine for economic development in the post-war period." "More recently," ie
continues, "for a variety of reasons, multinational corporations have been viewed as
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achieved notoriety by ,the exposure of the widespread business practices of
bribery, regarded as corrupting and conspiring with power elites to the detriment
of the masses of the population. 1 9
The foregoing examples of private groups have dealt chiefly with power and
wealth, with a brief allusion to scientific enlightenment. Specialized operations
connected with the gathering, processing and dissemination of current informa-
tion is often in the hands of news associations. These activities are especially
germane to the focussing or distraction of attention on matters that pertain to
human rights. The number of topics that may arouse the curiosity of human
beings, and which initiate the formation of groups, is infinite. In an important
sense a long range drive is to explore the total environment of mankind,
and-almost as a by-product-to discover the interconnectedness c' human lives.
Private as well as governmental groups are absorbed with all aspects of
well-being. These range from the survey of health threats and opportunities to
the cultivation of diversions that counteract any tendency toward boredom.
Another enormously variegated sector of value and institutional practice is
related to skill. Skills are occupational and professional; and they include all
manner of artistic expression, since a relatively distinctive use of skill implies the
completion of acts and of physical arrangements in ways that emphasize the
pattern of internal adjustment rather than the impact on wealth, power or
other discussions of social process. The "human right to enjoy and pursue
excellence in the arts" is a manifestation of deep-lying initiatives in human
personality.
Unquestionably the institutions related to intimacy and loyalty are deeply
intertwined with human rights. Wherever there is human contact it is probable
that friendship and intimacy will appear; and these commitments are frequently
such that barriers are pushed aside that seek to block these culminations.
With the intensification of association on a global scale it is clear that the
instruments of a new imperialism in which the rich exploit the poor and the haves exploit the
have-nots." Katzenbach, "Law-Making for Multinational Corporations, " in C. Black et al., A
New World Order? 25 (World Order Studies Program Occasional Paper No. 1, Princeton
University, Center of International Studies, 1975).
On tax problems involving multinational corporations, see a study prepared by Carl S.
Shoup for the United Nations: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
The Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on International
Relations- Technical Papers: Taxation, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/I 1 (1974).
19 See N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1976, sec. 3, at 1, col. 1 (containing a compilation of
reported payments abroad by American corporations for bribes, political contributions,
sales commissions, and other purposes); id, May 5, 1975, at 1, col. I (city ed.) ("U.S.
Company Payoffs Way of Life Overseas"); Cohen, Lockheed Cover-Up?, id., Mar. 29, 1976,
at 29. col. 2; Barnet, Not Just Your Corner Drugstore, id., June 19, 1975, at 35, col. 1. See
also Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis (A. Heidenheimer comp.
1970).
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interplay of admiration and contempt are differentiated, and that the giving and
receiving of respect become major demands that affect the patterns of respect.
In the same way global exposure modifies targets and judgments of decency and
belief (rectitude). These are among the parameters that define the content and
significance of human rights.
We note that the linkages between public and civic order are subtle, hence
visible only when special procedures are used to bring them to the focus of an
observer's attention. Complex socialist societies give relative prominence to the
role of government, hence of public order. As a rule the official doctrine
attempts to modulate the passage of public into private and of private into
explicity public activities. The pattern of ultimate regimentation on a world
scale would approximate a global prison camp in which the top hierarchy would
do everything it could to specify in detail the daily calendar of individual and
small group, as well as large-group, contact and mobilize every means for the
purpose of regimenting behavior in conformity with these detailed prescrip-
tions. 20 Thus far, at least, regimentation of this kind is rarely approximated.
Terror Groups and Gangs
We single out for special mention terror groups and gangs. Depending as
they do on the use of violent coercion it is obvious that they are functionally
related to power and can be thought of as closely akin to pressure groups. They
differ, however, in that although they rely on a form of power, they do not
necessarily limit themselves to the pursuit of power as the principal value toward
which their efforts are directed. 2 Some terror gangs are focussed on wealth, as
in the notorious instance of the slave trade, 2 2 or the organized criminal
20 This garrison state hypothcsis was originally presented by one of the authors in
1937. See Lasswell, Sino-Japanese Crisis: The Garrison State versits the Civilian State. 2
China Q. 643 (1937); Lasswcll, The Garrison State, 46 Am. J. Sociology 455 (1941):
Lasswell, The Garrison State Hypothesis Today, in Changig Patterns of Militari Politics
51-70 (S. Huntington ed. 1962). See also Fox, Harold D. Lasswell and the Stndv' of l'orld
Politics: Configurative Analysis, Garrison State, and World Conmontealth. in Politics,
Personality, and Social Science in the Twentieth Century: Essays in Honor of Harold D.
Lasswell 367-81 (A. Rogow ed. 1969).
Cf. A. Huxley, Brave New World (Bantam classic ed. 1958): A. Huxley, Brave New
World Revisited (1965); G. Orwell, 1984 (1949): 1984 Revisited: -Prospects J6r American
Politics (R. Wolff ed. 1973).
21 See United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Fitih United
Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Geneva, 1- 12
September 1975 (Report prepared by the Secretariat) 10-15, U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 56/10
(1976); W. Whyte, Street Corner Society (1943); Tyler, The Roots of Organized Crinme, 8
Crime and Delinquency 325 (1962), reprimted in Social Problems in a Chanmginmg World
198-214 (W. Gerson ed. 1969); N. Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1976, See. 1, at 1, col. 4 (city cd.).
22 See B. Davidson, Black Mother: The Years of the African Slave Trade (1961): C.
Greenidge, Slavery 49-57 (1958); S. O'Callaghan, The Slave Trade Today (1961):
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associations whose dealing in drugs or prostitution, for example, penetrate the
boundaries of many countries. Value objectives other than power or wealth are
seldom of major importance. In the past, however, we know of tribal societies
whose members engaged in mutual raiding that was principally a matter of
respect. It was a necessary act to demonstrate the readiness of a youth to
become a man.
In the contemporary world terror gangs have become particularly promi-
nent participants in the processes of politics, reflecting a complex constellation




The organizations mentioned heretofore include in their membership those
who by formally binding themselves together share significant traits. Un-
organized participants in the world social process share certain common
characteristics even though they are not typically joined together for joint
operations. We consider culture, class, interest, personality and crisis groups, and
give particular attention to the fact that they interact as conditioning factors
with the organized groups enumerated above.
Culture
The term culture is employed to designate distinctive and stable patterns of
values and institutions that are deployed around the globe. 2 4 Each culture may
assign value priorities in a somewhat distinctive manner, as when we find that
nomadic tribesmen glorify power whereas neighboring agriculturalists emphasize
Schaktcton, The Slave Trade Today, in Slavery: A Comparative Perspective 188 (R. Winks
ed. 1972).
23 See J. Bell, Transnational Terror (1975); International Terrorism and World
Security (D. Carlton & C. Schaerfeds, 1975); F. Hyams, Terrorists and Terrorism (1975); B.
Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict (1975): Report of the Ad Hoc
Committee on International Terrorism, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/9028
(1973); Rovinc, The Contemporary International Legal Attack on Terrorism, 3 Israel Y.B.
Human Rights 9 (1973); Terrorism and Political Crimes in International Law, [1973]
Proceedings, Am Soc'y Int'l L. 87.
See also N. Y. Timnes, Oct. 12, 1975, Sec. 1, at 1, col. 1 ("Organized Crime Reaps Huge
Profits from Dealing in Pornographic Films"); id, July 7, 1975, at 1, col. ("Key
Mafia Figure Tells of 'Wars' and Gallo-Colombo Peace Talks"); id, May 29, 1974, at 53, col.
I (city ed.) ("Kidnapping a Lucrative Crime in Argentina").
24 See H. Lasswell & A. Kaplan, supra note 1, at 47-51. See generally B. Malinowski, A
Scientific Theory of Culture, and Other Essays (1960): R. Benedict, Patterns of Culture
(1959): J. Honingmann, Understanding Culture (1963); A. Kroeber, The Nature of Culture
(1952); The Science of Man in the World Crisis (R. Linton ed. 1945) (especially articles by
Clyde Kluckhohn and William H. Kelly and by Abram Kardiner); E. Tylor, Primitive Culture
(1871); L. White, The Science of Culture: A Study of Man and Civilization (1949).
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the production of wealth and the gratifications of peace. Institutional practices
vary greatly from culture to culture and from value to value.
In earlier times-notably in the fourth or fifth millennium B.C. -the urban
division of labor supplemented tribal cultures with civilization. In more recent
years science and technology have moved toward universality, with the result that
communities throughout the globe exhibit an enormous variety of transitional
patterns. This distinctiveness has been described in many different ways:
"primitive, archaic, historic, pre-modern, or modern;" 25 traditional or modern;
nomadic, agricultural, industrial, or post-industrial. 26 The accent may be on
traditional collectivities or upon a multitude of functional (pluralized) groups.
The class structure may be limited to a two-class model, or diversified into a
multiple class system. There may be low or high social mobility.
2 7
In an increasingly interactive world the cultural factors play complicating
and contradictory roles. It is easy to recognize the trends toward instantaneous
news, transnational travel, or world science, for example. At the same time
observant individuals perceive that trends toward technological universalization
has not meant peace, understanding and cooperation for the common interest;
rather it often signifies the use of universal culture traits to enhance parochial
demands and identities, accompanied by partial adaptation to a limited number
of common activities. Abiding parochialism has meant that surviving or novel
practices are not always tolerated as functional equivalents. Conflicts arise over
different ways of doing the same thing and the aggregate common interest is not
discovered.
25 J. Peacock & A. Kirsch, The Human Direction: An Evolutionary Approach to Social
and Cultural Anthropology vi (1970).
In his analysis of religious evolution, Bellah conceptualizes in terms of five stages:
"primitive religion," "archaic religion," "historic religion," "early modern religion," and
"modern religion." Be~lah, Religious Evolution, 29 Am. Sociological Rev. 358 (1964). See
also R. Bellah, Beyond Belief Essays on Religion in a Post- Traditional World 20-50 (1976).
26 The classic work on the "stages" theory of economic growth, W. Rostow, The
Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (1960), characterizes the stages
as "the traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to
maturity, and the age of high mass consumption" (at 4). Cf A. Hirschman, The Strategy of
Economic Development (1968), which suggests the limitations of Rostow's theories. Cf. also
A. Organski, The Stages of Political Development (1965).
The term "post-industrial" is employed, and made popular, by Daniel Bell. For a
comprehensive treatment, see D. Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in
Social Forecasting (1973). Other scholars prefer other designations. For example, Brzezinki
prefers "technetronic" to "post-industrial:" Z. Brzezinski, Between Two Ages: America's
Role in the Technetronic Era 9 (1971).
27 For an outstanding account of different approaches to class and mobility in
contemporary societies, see R. Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society
(1959).
For a standard work on this subject, see S. Upset & R. Bendix, Social Mobility in
Industrial Society (1959). Also, cf T. Bottomore, Classes in Modern Society (1966).
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It may be worth emphasizing that urban civilization evolved only seven or
eight thousand years ago, and that prior to that time, prodigious emphasis was
put on identifying with small groups. 28 This was a necessary means of
socializing individuals to incorporate the demands of others, and prepared the
way for cooperation on a much larger scale. In civilization writing and other
modes of transmitting knowledge become dynamic factors in accelerating the
evolution of social institutions. 2 9
Anxieties are generated by the unceasing challenge to change by modifying
value priorities and institutional arrangements. 3 0 "Culture shock" is a continu-
ing cost of innovation and complicates the task of those who strive for effective
action in the field of human rights.
3 '
Class
Within any given society, classes are formed according to the degree of
control individuals exercise over values. All known societies are more or less
class-ridden, although the character and magnitude of stratification differ from
one community to another. 3 2 Rigidity of stratification exhibits a wide spectrum
that ranges from a highly hierarchized, dosed society to an open society that is
highly mobile.
33
28 V. Gordon Childe stresses the central importance of the creation of cities for the
emergence of civilization. The invention is tentatively located in a few river valleys (notably
the Nile, the Tigris-Euphrates, and the Indus) about 7,000 years ago. See V. Childe, New
Light on the Most Ancient East (1935). See also R. Redfield, The Primitive World and Its
Transformations (1953).
29 Cf. L. Mumford, The City in History (1961); L. Mumford, The Culture of Cities
(1938).
30 This theme has been dramatically popularized by a recent best-seller: A. Toffler,
Future Shock (Bantam ed. 1971). Cf C. Walker, Technology, Industry, and Man: The Age of
Acceleration (1968).
3 1 
See A. Toffler, supra note 30, at 10-11, 347-48.
32 A valuable anthology that combines fragments of many of the classics and empirical
studies is Class, Status, and Power (R. Bendix & S. Lipset eds. 2d ed. 1966). For a critique of
the class system in Communist countries by a top Yugoslav official in disgrace, see M. Djlas,
The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System (1959).
See also B. Bernard, Social Stratification: A Comparative Analysis of Structure and
Process (1957); Social Inequality (A. Beteille ed. 1969); The Impact of Social Class (P.
Blumberg ed. 1971): R. Brown, Social Psychology 101-51 (1965); A. Hollingshead & F.
Redlich, Social Class and Mental Illness (1958); Comparative Perspectives on Stratification:
Mexico, Great Britain, Japan (J. Kahl ed. 1968); G. Lenski, Power and Privilege: A Theory
of Social Stratification (1966); J. Lopreato & L. Hazelrigg, Class, Conflict and Mobility
(1972); J. Schumpeter, Social Classes (1951); A. Tuden & L. Plotnicov, Social Stratification
in Africa (1970); T. Tumin, Social Stratification: The Forms and Functions of Inequality
(1972).
33 Highly hierarchized, closed societies are exemplified by societies in which the caste
system or the practice of apartheid prevails. For further factual background and pertinent
references, see 7he Protection of Respect, supra note 4, at 980-1034.
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From the time of their first appearance urban civilizations have accentuated
class differences with special reference to wealth and power. The rich and the
poor, the strong and the weak became the criteria of identification, superseding
family and kinship as bases of loyalty.
The class divisions of modern urban and industrial society combined with
the structure of feudalism to lend plausibility to political movements in the
name of class. Class distinctions, however, continue to clash with other
perspectives. Upper, middle and lower class attitudes are often in conflict with
conceptions of equal opportunity for all.
3 4
Interest
The factor of interest cuts across both culture and class lines. Less
comprehensive than either culture or class groupings, interest groups are formed
in reference to particular values, institutional perspectives and operations. In a
modern technological society a great number of interest groups is continually
generated as a consequence of the division of labor and the multiplication of
patterns of both symbols and operations. Consequently, perspectives about
interest have tended to cut across and dissolve large cultural and class groupings.
The result is to increase the frequency and fluidity of the coalitions involved in
the shaping and sharing of values. 35 The individuals who constitute the core of
an interest group may be widely distributed over the globe. Typically they are
surrounded by persons whose perspectives are nebulous and whose conduct is
little influenced by the central perspective. Contemporary processes, dynamic as
they are, confront individuals with a bewildering variety of interests. Collective
programs-focussed on human rights, for example-suffer corresponding difficul-
ties.
Personality
The conception of personality is not to be confused with the individual as a
biological entity. 3 6 The biological entity that appears at birth is equipped with
Concerning open, mobile, societies, see, e.g., G. Carlsson, Social Alobilit , and Class
Structure (1958); Social Mobility in Britain (D. Glass ed. 1955); S. Lipsct & R. Bendix.
supra note 27.
34 Systematic inquiry on class has owed significantly to Lloyd Warner and associates,
who stressed upper-class exemptions from law enforcement. On middlc-and upper-class
violations in general, see D. Cressey, Other People's loney' (1953): A. Suthcrland. White
Collar Crime (1949). The late Svend Ranulf employed quantitative methods to investigate
the impact of changes in class structure upon the scope and severity of criminal legislation.
See S. Ranulf, Moral Indignation and Middle Class Psychology: A Sociological Study
(1964). Research on class remains relatively undifferentiated, focusing largely upon wealth,
respect and skill.
35 See H. Lasswell & A. Kaplan, supra note 1, at 40-45. Cf note 15 supra.
36 Personality has been given a wide range of references. A useful compendium of
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dispositions to initiate and to respond to the various components of the body
and also of the surrounding environment. The physical individual becomes a
"person" in the process of interaction. When an act is rewarded by a value
indulgence-such as food and cuddling-the result is to strengthen the tendency
to initiate or complete the rewarded act. If the completed act is met with value
deprivations rather than indulgences the resulting tendency is to avoid or cut the
act short. Taken as a whole, the dispositions of the person to interact in a
discernible manner are "personality."
Without going into detail it is nevertheless useful to recognize that a
personality system, viewed as an entirety, includes three categories of acts. The
ego covers all the moods and images that are fully conscious. The super-ego
includes the norms that are automatically implied to bar the completion of act
or to expedite completion as a compulsive or obsessional occurrence. The id
refers to basic impulses, especially to those that are denied expression by the
superego. 
3 7
Personality structures are formed in interaction with patterns of culture. At
any given time the exposure of the person to the value indulgences or
deprivations of the culture environment results in the formation of an ego and
superego system that incorporates the value priorities and practices. To the
degree that "socialization" is successful personalities monitor themselves in
accordance with the identities, demands and expectations of the culture.
3 8
articlc on this subjcct is Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture (C Kluckhohn & H.
Murray eds. 2d ed. 1953).
The major theoretical positions are well described in M. Deutsch & R. Krauss, 7heories
in Social Psychology (1965). See also G. Allport, Becoming: Basic Considerations for a
Psychology of Personality (1955); G. Allport, Personality and Social Encounter (1960); G.
Hall & G. Lindzey, Theories of Personality (1957); R. Lazarus, Personality (1963); A.
Maslow, Motivation and Personality (1954).
37 See S. Freud, The Complete Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis 521-75 (J.
Strachey transl. 1969) [hereinafter cited as S. Freud]; S. Freud, The Ego and the Id (J.
Rivicre transl. J. Strachey cd. 1962). See also C. Brenner, An Elementary Textbook of
Psychoanalysis (rev. ed. 1974); H. Lasswell, & A. Kaplan, supra note 1, at 10-15.
38 An excellent overview of socialization and personality development is Socialization
and Personality Development (. Zigler & I. Child cds. 1973) (containing a comprehensive
bilibography). See also R. Brown, supra note 32, at 193-417; F. Greenstein, Children and
Politics (1965); Personality and Socialization (D. Heise ed. 1972); H. Hyman, Political
Socialization (1959); G. Mead, supra note 1; P. Mussen, J. Conger, & J. Kagan, Child
Development and Personality (1963); T. Parsons & R. Bates, Farily: Socialization and
Interaction Process (1955); Personality and Social Systems (N. Smelser & W. Smelser eds.
1963); Sears, Political Socialization, in 2 Handbook of Political Science 93-153 (F.
Greenstein & N. Polsby eds. 1975).
For an understanding of the different worlds of childhood, see P. Aries, Centuries of
Childhood (1962). See also U. Bronfenbrenner, Two Vorlds of Childhood (1972) (an
interesting comparative study); Childhood in China (W. Kessen ed. 1975); J. Whiting & I.
Child, Child Training and Personality: A Cross-Cultural Study (1953).
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It is apparent that if violations of human rights are component elements of a
culture, it is essential to bring about the reconstruction of culture before the
norms compatible with human rights are effectively realized. Within the broad
framework of a culture many of the established class and interest group
differences must be changed before human rights can become embedded in
culture.
It has often been argued that human beings include natural "slaves" and
that the demand to move toward a public and civic order of human dignity is a
chimera. Much evidence has accumulated to show that the biological inheritance
is relatively plastic, and that persons who are subjected to a culture of slavery
will conform to their socialization. However, there is ample evidence that the
culture of slavery is not an inevitable outcome.3 9 The variety of human
motivations are such that varying degrees of rejection have culminated in "slave
revolts" and in the substitution of cultures of freedom. In particular, there is
evidence that personalities who are totally power-indulged or power-deprived
exhibit characteristics that limit the potential creativity of the persons
concerned.
The personality structure of the oppressor (depriver) is of particularly direct
concern to the analyst of human rights and of the circumstances in which
cultures are altered in ways that discourage the formation of value deprivers. The
modern study of personality growth recognizes the important consequences of
early experiences of deprivation of affection, respect and other significant
outcome opportunities. 4 0 Persons who occupy an advantaged social position
often respond to the ordinary misadventures of life by intense overreactions that
seize every occasion to reaffirm the significance of the weakened ego by
attacking the self-respect of other human beings, and especially by adopting an
intransigent attitude toward anyone who, occupying an inferior position in
society, attemps to improve his status or to alter the established routines of the
social structure. These truly "reactionary" personalities stand in the way of
relatively peaceful readjustment of the system of value shaping and sharing, and
therefore seek to block the spread of effective adoption and enforcement of
norms compatible with human rights.
4 1
39 Cf A. Kardiner & L. Ovesey, The Mark of Oppression (1951).
40 Cf. 0. Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis (1945); K. Horney, Our
Inner Conflicts: A Constructive Theory of Neurosis (1945); H. Lasswell, Power and
Personality (1962).
41 For broad, sometime questionable, expositions of the basic point, see R. Ardrey,
The Territorial Imperative (1966); K. Lorenz, On Aggression (1966); D. Morris, The Naked
Ape: A Zoologist's Study of the Human Animal (1967).
For more hopeful views of human nature, see A. Alland, The Human Imperative
(1972); R. Dubos, So Human an Animal (1968); R. Dubos, Beast or Angel? (1974); E.
Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness (1973).
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Crisis
The connotations of a crisis include stress generated by conflict and the
likelihood that some members of a group, at least, will suffer value deprivation.
Among the most evident factors in the study of world change are the crises that
are internal or external to organized or unorganized groups. Many crises fail to
correspond to any definite line of demarcation since they involve participants
who are widely scattered in accord with culture, class or similar characteristics.
The recurring crises among organized groups receive the greatest attention,
whether the value frame of reference is power, wealth, or other. Among the
more subtle crises are the tensions elicited between traditional and innovative
sharers of an established culture, or between the compulsive-obsessional
mechanisms and the innovative mechanisms at the disposal of personalities in
decision-making elites. 
4 2
Studies of crisis tend to confirm the view that a moderate level of tension is
a valuable incentive for well-considered change. The fact of crisis is enough to
open many minds to the probability that prevailing values and institutions are
less than perfect; and the modesty of the crisis permits the rational use of the
mind-and of collective policy processes-in the search for solutions.
4 3
Perspectives
It is the perspectives of the individuals who participate in the world
social process that constitute the predispositional variables which in interaction
with the environmental factors affect the flow of deprivations and fulfillment of
values. These perspectives may be described in terms of demands for values, the
identities of these for whom such values are demanded, and expectations about
the conditions affecting the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of values.
Demands
The demands people make for preferred events in the contemporary world
cover a wide range of values, whatever the particular characterizations employed,
42 See, for instance, a brilliant case study probing the tension between tradition and
modernity among the Dinka, a Nilotic people in the Republic of the Sudan: F. Deng,
Tradition and Modernization: A Challenge for Law among the Dinka of the Sudan (1971).
43 In the words of Dubos:
Crises are practically always a source of enrichment and of renewal because they
encourage the search for new solutions. These solutions cannot come from a
transformation of human nature, because it is not possible to change the genetic
endowment of the human species. But they can come from the manipulation of
social structures, because these affect the quality of behavior and of the environment,
and therefore the quality of life.
Dubos, The Humanizing of Humans, Saturday Rev./World, Dec. 14, 1974, at 76, 80.
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and embrace every variety of nuance in institutional practice in the shaping and
sharing of values. It has already been shown that in many parts of the world
people increasingly share rising common demands for human dignity values.
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In other parts of the globe countertrends may predominate. The different
demands that are made for values are sometimes inclusive, in the sense that they
affect many people, and are linked with expectations of reciprocity for all those
comparably situated. Sometimes demands are exclusive in the sense that they are
made on behalf of rather limited identities and actually affect very few
participants in the world process. On occasion demands may be special rather
than common, since they are made without regard for the value consequences
affecting others, whether they are few or many. Similarly, demands may be
constructive and expansionist, designed to increase aggregate values for all, or
defensive, intended to protect existing values, whether of all or of relatively
exclusive groups. In chosen modality, demands may vary from the most manifest
and explicit to the latent and the covert.4 5
In most of the world today, there is, as a consequence of socialization, a high
and continuing acquiescence in the prevailing pattern of equality or inequality in
the shaping and sharing of values. Millions of the earth's population are
socialized to acquiesce in whatever plight of deprivation and non-fulfillment they
have come to know in their cultural environment. Established deprivations and
non-fulfillments tend to be internalized and tolerated by the middle and lower
classes.4 6 Many people are so cut off from the outside world, and so
44 In very recent times, as decolonization, nation-building, and the expanding role of
government have gone hand in hand, hitherto deprived groups and peoples in every
continent have made insistent demands for wider participation in the shaping and sharing of
values. Contemporary demands for human rights, especially freedom and equality, are made
in both positive and negative terms, in both individual and collective terms, and in both
national and transnational terms. For further elaboration, see McDougal. Lasswell. & Chen.
supra note 3.
Long ago Tocqueville pointed out the distinctively dynamic and expanding character
of the demand for equality. Once human beings achieve equality in some respects, their
quest becomes "totalistic," moving toward equality in all respects. See A. de Tocqueville.
Democracy in America (J. Mayer ed. 1969). See also T. Marshall. Class, Citizenship, and
Social Development 65-122 (1964); Fallers, Equality, Modernity, and Denocracy in the
New States, in Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernitv in Asia and Africa
158, 204-19 (C. Geertz ed. 1963).
45 Cf. R. Brown, supra note 32, at 358-59; S. Freud, supra note 37, at 113-25; R.
Merton, On Theoretical Sociology 73-1:38- (1967).
46 A miscellany of researches tends to corrobor;,te the broad hypothesis that "the
lower the value position of the participant who suffers a value deprivation the less probable
the resort to official arenas; and, once there, the less likely to obtain a value-indulgent
result." We need remind ourselves only of the continuing deprivations to which the
powerless, the uninformed, the poor, the weak, the untrained, the unloved, the disrespected
and the heretics are subjected. For a preliminary approach to an appraisal of the working of
our "criminal" and "civil" codes, see R. Arens & H. Lasswell, supra note 1. On other
dimensions, see A. Rogow & H. Lasswell, supra note 1.
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conditioned by internal routines, that their latent demands for greater
participation in the shaping and sharing of values are suppressed or repressed.
This continues to characterize the world scene in spite of growing discontent
based on widened experience and exposure to agitational activity.
4 7
The demand for total subordination to a governing elite continues in many
localities and among many functional groups. Many elite are trained to take no
notice of the fact that they are imposing deprivations on others or denying the
fulfillment of values. In part this seeming callousness is to be understood as a
standard result of a process of socialization that displaces private motives on
public objects and rationalizes these objectives in terms of common interest.
4 8
Iden tifications
People demand values for particular identities, with various levels of
inclusiveness. Changing perspectives of demand and expectation bring about
changes in conceptions of the self. The self-system of each individual is
composed of the primary ego symbol (of the "I," "me") and the symbols of
reference singly or collectively to those egos who are included in a common
"we". 49 The self-system also includes symbols that identify the "non-self
other," such as members of other nation states. It is clear on analysis that
individuals have multiple identifications, some of which may cross cut and
latently conflict with one another.5 0 While some identifications are ascriptive,
and reflect the traditional routines of a social context, more and more
identifications appear to be matters of individual choice.
As indicated above, the identifications of many individuals express high
ambivalence, exhibiting both expanding and contracting empathy with the
inclusive community. 5 Sometimes human dignity demands are made on behalf
of lesser groups, even tiny localities and small functional groups.
47 Since Plato and Aristonc attention has focussed explicitly upon the problem of
maintaining public order by fostering an appropriate "character". The problem is that of
creating self-systems in which the primary ego identifies with the body politic sufficiently to
demand of the self and others that behavior conform to what is required to defend and
extend the value position of the body politic. In industrialized societies failures of political
socialization in the early years are alleged to encourage "alienation." Transition from
traditional to industrial societies is alleged to depend on "empathetic" personalities and on
"achievement" orientation. The pertinent context is sketched in G. Almond & S. Verba,
Civil Culture (1963): F. Greenstein, supra note 38; E. Hagen, The Theory of Social Change
(1962); D. Lerner, supra note 9; D. McClelland, The Achieving Society (1961).
48 See H. Lasswell, supra note 40, at 20-38.
49 An outstanding compendium containing various theories about the self system is
The Self in Social Interaction (C. Gordon & K. Gergen eds. 1968). See also R. Merton, supra
note 1; P. Rose, They and We (1965); S. Schachter, The Psychology of Affiliation (1959).
5 0 See H. Guetzkow, Multiple Loyalties (1955); G. Simmel, Conflict and the Web of
Group-Affiliation (K. Wolff & R. Bendix transl. 1955).
51 See McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, supra note 3.
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In an epoch of exacerbated nationalism and accelerated nation-building, it
must be recognized that dominant identities (loyalties) remain parochial, not
universal. Sentiment on behalf of "spaceship earth" remains scattered and
weak. 5 2 It is relatively unusual for people to evolve a system of identities that
ranges from the importance of the individual human being to the whole of
humankind.
Exaggerated images of the difference between the "self" and "other" help
to account for the continuing vogue of large scale deprivation. How the deprivor
perceives and identifies the deprivee (target) is crucial. The deprivee may be
perceived as possessing common humanity, or as a "sub-human" "thing." When
human beings are perceived as sub-human, it is easy to magnify perspectives of
hatred and contempt, and to further denigrate the "humanity" of the target.
5 3
In the early stages, at least, of a rapidly expanding technological society,
local symbols of identity may weaken. However, this is usually for the benefit of
intermediate entities (like nation-states) that are intermediate between the
older territory and the inclusive world community. 5 4
A persisting residue of the ancient past and of more recent conflict is the
practice of imaging both the self and other in terms of characteristics that bear
no rational relation to basic humanity and to potential contributions to the
common interest. Random characteristics, having no relation to capability, are
seized upon to justify deprivations, to exclude participation, and to deny
fulfillment. Notable examples are phrased in reference to race, color, sex,
religion, political or other opinion, language, nationality, age, and life style.5 5
52 Cf B. Ward, Spaceship Earth (1966).
53 Reflecting upon the Nazi atrocities against the Jews, Yosal Rogat suggests that
to be capable of ultimate cruelty men must first cut off sympathy for and
iden tification with their victims by perceiving them as beings fundamentally different
in kind from themselves; or, perhaps more accurately, not as beings at all, but as
things.
Y. Rogat, The Eichmann Trial and Rule of Law 9 (1961).
Similarly, Chief Albert Luthuli observes:
We Africans are depersonalised by the whites; our humanity and dignity is reduced in
their imaginations to a minimum. We are 'boys,' 'girls,' 'Kaffirs,' 'good natives' and
'bad natives.' But we are not, to them, really quite people, scarcely more than units
in a labour force and parts of a 'Native Problem.'
A. Luthuli, Let My People Go 155 (1962).
Cf M. Buber, I and Thou (W. Kaufmann transl. 1970); 0. Klineberg, The Human
Dimension in international Relations 33-48 (1965); Berkowitz & Green, The Stimulus
Qualities of the Scapegoat, 64 J.Abnormal & Social Psychology 293 (1962).
54 See Lasswell, Future Systems of Identity in the World Community, in 4 The Future
of the International Legal Order 3-31 (C. Black & R. Falk eds. 1972).
55 See note 4 supra.
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Expectations
The degree to which peoples can attain their demanded values is deeply
affected by the comprehensiveness and realism of their expectations about the
conditions under which these values can be secured. It cannot be denied that
peoples of today's world exhibit almost every conceivable degree of comprehen-
siveness and realism in their expectations about the circumstances that
determine the realization of human dignity.
The expectations of the great bulk of humankind are still fragmented and
uninformed. Few individuals have a cognitive map of the world social process of
value shaping and sharing. Relatively few have access to the information
(intelligence) essential to the attainment of such a map. Comparable to the
absence of inclusive identification with the global community, there is a failure
to achieve a shared vision of the conditions and potentialities of a comprehen-
sive, concerted program for the realization of dignified, humane existence for
humankind as a whole.
Despite a growing perception of interdependence, the signigicant facts of
global interdependence are not widely understood. The intimate inter-
dependences that condition the inner and external relations of particular value
processes at all levels of geographic and functional interaction are rarely
explored and articulated with the necessary comprehensiveness and realism.
5 6
Even when common values are objects of demand, the effort to clarify and imple-
ment common interest falters, with result that participants in the total inter-
action do not necessarily recognize their common interests, both inclusive and
exclusive. In consequence assertions of special interest are often made that are
destructive of the common interest.5 7 Further, they exhibit varying degrees of
willingness or unwillingness to engage in the task of clarifying, articulating, and
implementing common interest. Too many individuals, living in too many parts
of the world, continue to expect to gain more by perpetuating the practices of
human indignity rather than by transforming the routines of the world com-
munity by promoting human dignity through cooperative activities.
In a divided world where pervasive expectations of violence generate chronic
anxiety and personal insecurity, many individuals and groups still expect to be
better off by strategies of violence rather than of peaceful cooperation. Many
governing elites, preoccupied with the consolidation and expansion of power, are
determined to exclude most of the population from participating effectively in
important value processes. They therefore continue to impart a distorted world
56 For an attempt at articulation of interdependences, see McDougal, Lasswell, &
Chen, supra note 3.
57 For our concepts on interests, see M. McDougal, H. Lasswell, & I. Vlasic, Supra note
1, at 145-67.
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view to their people. They not infrequently mobilize the masses in ways that
encourage docility despite persisting circumstances of deprivation and non-
fulfillment. They cultivate international tension as a means of deflecting latent
hostility against foreign targets.
58
There are, more happily, increasing numbers of people who realistically
perceive the interdependences of the world, and who expect to achieve human
dignity values through peaceful cooperation. Closely connected with this
perception of interdependence is the revolution of "rising expectations," and its
frequent accompaniment of "rising frustrations." A view that distinguishes the
contemporary world, from the outlook of traditional societies, is the assumption
that within ever widening limits it is possible for human beings to control their
destiny. This is attributable in part to the explosive expansion of scientific
knowledge and in part to the realization that historic inequalities have no
anchorage in an immutable decree of nature. In consequence the middle and
lower strata of the global community, such as the undeveloped nations, are
stirred by a spark of hope that is fanned by a sense of injustice at their
traditional predicament. Despite elite efforts to hold the rank and file of the
population in check, more people are coming to entertain the expectation that
the endurance of deprivation and non-fulfillment of values is no rational answer
to deprivation, and that things can be changed for the better.
5 9
Con tending systems of public order
All these competing demands, ambivalent identifications, and conflicting
expectations of individuals and groups today interact and culminate in
contending systems of public order. It is the great diversity in the demands,
identifications, and expectations of peoples that underlies the contemporary
contention of different systems of world public order, a contention which
render the fulfillment of human dignity values increasingly difficult.
Rhetorically, the major contending systems are in many fundamental
respects already unified. All systems proclaim the dignity of the human
individual and the ideal of a worldwide public order in which this ideal is
authoritatively pursued and effectively approximated. They differ, however, in
58 Cf Wicker, Jobs and Crimes, N. Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1975, at 33, col. 5 (city cd.).
For development of the theme that revolutionary elites, once in power, scek scapegoats
to lower people's expectations because of limited resources availablc for fulfilling popular
aspirations for equitable distribution, see H. Arendt, On Revoit tion ( 1963).
59 See J. Skolnick, The Politics of Protest (1969): Williams, The Rise of Middle Class
Activism: Fighting "City Hall," Saturday Rev., Mar. 8, 1975, at 12-16; N. Y. Times. Dec. 11.
1974, at 18, col. 4 (city ed.) ("New Militance Bringing Gains for Japan's 'Outcasts'"):N. Y.
Times, Dec. 9, 1976, at 1, col. 5 (city ed.) (growing and intensc demands for land by
Mexican peons).
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many details of the institutionalized patterns of practice by which they seek to
achieve such goals both in specific areas and in the world as a whole.
6 0
Universal words in praise of human dignity obviously do not imply universal
deeds in harmony with the rhetoric. The crux of the matter is that operational
practices in the shaping and sharing of values diverge widely from professed
goals. Special interests continue to assert themselves in effective sabotage of
proclaimed objectives. There remains chronic tension among competing common
interests, interests whose accommodation is always necessary.
6 
1 The realization
of the overriding prescriptions of an authoritative legal system depends upon
compatible structures in the decision process as a whole, and in the everyday
mustering of support in coalitions that give effect to aspiration.
Situations
The fundamental dimensions of the social process set the parameters within
which the shaping and sharing of values must proceed. These parameters are not
immutable. Even the geographic constraints that affect life on this planet are in
flux, and the temporal sequences and juxtapositions of interactive factors are of
decisive significance. We have made previous references to the tangle of
institutional practice, and the levels of crisis action that circumscribe results.
Geographic features
The geographical ramifications of value deprivations and non-fulfillment
may be universal, regional, national, or sub-national in either origin or impact.
Within particular communities, further, these impacts may be central or
peripheral, omnipresent or occasional. The global scene has never before been
the stage for interactive 'events of such frequency, intensity, and impact. More
and more occurrences ignore state boundaries and generate repercussions beyond
the limits of a single state. 6 2 The movement of people, goods and services, and
60 See McDougal & Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of
Public Order, 53 Am. J. Int'l L.(1959); reprinted in International Law in the Twentieth
CenturY 169-97 (L. Gross ed. 1969). Cf K. Boulding, The Meaning of the Twentieth
Century 156-79 (1965); W. F:riedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law
325-40 (1964); R. Higgins, Conflict of Interests: International Law in a Divided World
(1965); C. Jenks, The Common Law of Mankind ch. 2 (1958); Lissitzyn,_ International Law
in a Divided World, 542 Int'l Conciliation (1963); Pachter, The Meaning of Peaceful
Coexistence, Problems of Communism, Jan-Feb. 1961, at 1-8.
61 See McDougal, Human Rights and World Public Order: Principles of Content and
Procedure Jbr Clarifying General Community Policies, 14 Va. J. Int'l L. 387 (1974);
McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, The Aggregate Interest in Shared Respect and Human Rights:
The Harmonization of Public Order and Civic Order, 23 N.Y.L.S.L. Rev. 183 (1977). See
also M. McDougal, H. Lasswell, & J. Miller, supra note 1, at 35-77.
62 See United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1974 Report on
the World Social Situations 8-13, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 5]512]Rev. 1 (ST/ESA/24) (1975).
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ideas involve several nation states. The cumulative impact of even the most
local-seeming event may be transnational in scope. Parallel events may be
observable on a world-wide scale. This means that in contrast to previous times
when the shock wave generated by war, natural disaster or other significant
events could be contained within a particular locality (or the adjacent area),
contemporary events tend to reverberate with great rapidity throughout the
globe. In actuality the transnational community is a complex matrix of
situations whose spatial limits have begun to transcend "habitat earth" and to
implicate other components of the solar system. 6 3 To take one another into
account is the most enlightened form of interaction; and it is evident today that
the inhabitants of the globe constitute a whole that take one another
progressively into consideration.
We must not, however, exaggerate the degree to which awareness has been
universally achieved. Many peoples remain outside the major forums of
interaction; they are, for one reason or another, anchored in their localities
without significant contact with the outside environment. Even now there are
large blocks and pockets that permit little penetration by "outsiders." As a result
the world at large is totally uninformed about the deprivations and non-
fulfillments that persists in those areas. 6 4 We cannot therefore asume that
63 See M. McDougal, H. Lasswell, & I. Vlasic, supra note 1.
64 For example, the tight control exercised by the Soviet elite over all forms of
communication made it possible to conceal from most Russians, as well as the outside
world, the true scope of the famine of 1932-33. Rumors could not be confirmed because of
the restriction upon freedom of movement inside the Soviet Union. Foreign correspondents
stationed in Moscow could not hold their post if they tried to send out dispatches at
variance with Soviet policy. To smuggle such reports out of the country opened the
correspondent to retaliation by the goverment (withdrawal of visa and other essential
privileges). Persistent filing of dispatches with censorable material simply meant that the
home paper received nothing from its correspondent, since the censors interfered with
transmission. Hence the home newspaper or press association was confronted by the
dilemma of encouraging foreign staffs to conform to the official line, or of ceasing to
maintain a news contact.
For more recent examples in the Soviet Union, see H. Smith, The Russians 344-74
(1976). After providing a list of examples, Smith concludes:
What is striking about such a list is that the Soviet people are being denied an
accurate general picture of their own life and their own society, let alone a chance to
compare it with other societies. Censorship prevents that.
Id. at 374.
Comparable problems exist in China and other relatively closed societies. As Marva
Shearer writes: "Since 1969, more Americans have landed on the moon than have visited
Tibet in the People's Republic of China." Shearer, A Journey to the Roof of the World,
Parade, Dec. 12, 1976, at 6.
Similarly, after a massive earthquake (the initial shock measured at 8.2 on the Richter
scale, "the world's worst earthquake in twelve years") struck Tangshan in northern China (a
thriving coal and steel city inhabited by more than one million people) in July 1976, no
casualty figures were released. It was only in January 1977, more than five months later,
that "Peking confirmed for the first time that the quake had taken as many as 700,000
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parochialism is overcome as a direct consequence of accelerated communication.
It is, in fact, typical to find that symbols of local references have multiplied so
rapidly at the focus of attention that wider aspects of the world are effectively
excluded.
Over a longer interval it is to be assumed that the annihilation of distance by
modern technology will accentuate the sense of relative deprivation in a
particular area and magnify the importance of non-fulfillment everywhere. In
the words of NcNamara:
For centuries stagnating societies and deprived peoples remained content
with their lot because they were unaware that life was really any better
elsewhere. Their very remoteness saved them from odious comparisons.
The technological revolution changed all that.Today, the transistor radio
and the television tube in remote corners of the world dramatize the




Value deprivation and non-fulfillment have temporal dimensions. The
duration of a particular practice may be temporary or permanent, and its
manifestation may be sporadic or continuous. The more permanent and
continuous the deprivation the greater is the destruction of human dignity values
and the danger of destructive response.
Instantaneous global communication informs the world about itself. The
world community is in effect becoming an open forum in constant session on
matters of value deprivation and indulgence. 6 6 When deprivations occur it is no
lives." Hua's Crackdown, Newsweek, Jan. 17, 1977, at 33. See China's Killer Quake, id.,
Aug. 9, 1976, at 30-32.
65 R. McNamara, One Hundred Countries, Two Billion People 90 (1973).
66 In the words of Marshall McLuhan:
Today, after more than a century of electric technology, we have extended our
central nervous system itself in a global embrace, abolishing both space and time as
far as our planet is concerned.
M. McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man 3 (1964).
Similarly, Cater observes:
The Gutenberg communicator-for the past 500 years patiently transmitting
experience line by fine, usually left to right, down the printed page-is no longer
relevant. TV man has become conditioned to a total communication environment, to
constant stimuli which he shares with everyone else in society.
Cater, The Intellectual in Videoland, Saturday Rev., May 31, 1975, at 12, 15.
For a perceptive analysis of the instantaneity and totality of contemporary
communication as revolutionalized by television, see T. Schwartz, The Responsive Chord
(1973)
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longer necessary-in a host of specific instances-to wait for days or weeks
before hearing, for example, of imprisonment without a trial. 6 7
It is important, however, to recognize that, while instantaneity in
communication has grown, many interferences prevent realization of the full
potential of instantaneity. Countering the growing demand to spread informa-
tion quickly is the no less intense demand by many elites to stifle information.
Trapped in a pervasive sense of insecurity, many power elites attempt to
maintain their ascendency by keeping the levels of aspiration of their peoples
low and to accomplish this by insulating the rank and file of the population
from open exposure to the outside world. Messages that originate in the outside
community are carefully scrutinized and tightly controlled in the hope of
forestalling any "contamination" of established perspectives.
6 8
More positively, it seems to be impracticable for apprehensive ruling classes
to prevent "leakage" of information from the outside world into their domains.
This occurs as an incident to any contact in the spheres of science, music, sport,
medicine, and so on. Further, modern instruments enable compatible political
persons and groups to maintain covert, if not overt, communication with one
another and to coordinate strategies of change. 6 9
Ins titutionalization
As the intensity of contact increases in space and time, institutional changes
are initiated, diffused or restricted as means of protecting or extending the value
For an interesting study of humankind's temporal environment from historical and
comparative perspectives, see The Future of Time: Man's Temporal Environment (H. Yaker,
H. Osmond, & F. Cheek eds. 1971).
67 In reporting upon the closed nature of the Soviet society, Hedrick Smith wrote:
It [the Soviet government] has stopped jamming ;elected Western radio stations but
has kept sufficient controls at home to prevent the contamination of free ideas from
stirring new creativity among the intelligentsia, many of whose members seem more
interested in the latest Western fashions than in dissident ideas.
N.Y. Times,.Dec. 23. 1974, at 1, col. 1, col. 4; at 16, col. I (city ed.).
He continued:
Censorship remains tight. Except for brief, chance encounters, foreigners are allowed
to mingle with only a selected segment of society.
Id., at. 16, col. 1.
68 Recently, for instance, most Eastern European countries have intensified efforts to
curb the "bourgeois ideological plague." N. Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1976, Sec. 1, at 6, col. 1 (city
ed.).
69 In the words of Claydon:
Recent improvements in transportation and communications have enabled groups in
different parts of the world to recognize their common inferior status, have
facilitated their mobilization into organizations capable of pressing effectively for
remedial action, and have secured the dissemination of potentially useful methods for
rectifying such situations.
Claydon, supra note 7, at 29.
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positions of participants. The cultural matrix of deprivations and non-fulfillment
may or may not be institutionalized. Deprivations or non-fulfillment may be
organized or unorganized, patterned or unpatterned, centralized or decentral-
ized, secret or open. The pattern of deprivation and non-fulfillment may be
occasional or systematic and routinized. 70 Sometimes deprivations and non-
fulfillment are so deeply ingrained in cultural practices that members of the
community are hardly conscious of their existence. 7 1 At other times, in
contrast, deprivations and non-fulfillment may be made a deliberate and
manifest instrument of oppression and of monopoly. 7
2
In a technologically differentiated society, both public and private activities
have become highly complex and institutionalized. Organizational complexity in
government, in the corporate world, and in other sectors of life is subjecting
people to intense organizational pressures. They respond by feeling like cogs in a
machine, or simple accessories to the technology and organization. Their
autonomy, integrity, and spontaneity as human beings are in jeopardy. It is
quite evident that big organizations follow a logic of their own. Stressing the
purposes and efficiency of the organization as paramount, they tend to adopt a
purely instrumental view of the human beings at their disposal. In extreme cases,
they have practically taken possession of the lives of their members, directing
their basic political orientation, controlling the information that reaches their
focus of attention, and decisively influencing their opportunities for work and
livelihood, education, health and recreation, recognition, friendship, family
activities, and religious observances.
7 3
The psychological impacts of large scale organization are compounded by
70 Both apartheid and caste epitomize a pattern of systematic, routinized deprivation.
See The Protection of Respect, supra note 4, at 980-84, 994-1004.
71 For instance, it may seem paradoxical that, despite the liberation movement, many
of the scx-based deprivations continue to be accepted, consciously or unconsciously, as an
inescapable fact of life by vast segments of the female population around the world. See
Human Rights for Women, supra note 4, at 498-507.
72 Amnesty International's country-by-country survey indicates that torture is
increasingly becoming a deliberate instrument of policy in many communities:
Policemen, soldiers, doctors, scientists, judges, civil servants, politicians are involved
in torture whether in direct beating, examining victims, inventing new devices and
techniques, sentencing prisoners on extorted false confessions, officially denying the
existence of torture, or using torture as a means of maintaining their power. And
torture is not simply an indigenous activity, it is international; foreign experts are
sent from one country to another, schools of torture explain and demonstrate
methods, and modern torture equipment used in torture is exported from one
country to another.
Amnesty International, Report on Torture 21 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Report on
Torture].
73 See R. Presthus, The Organizational Society (1962); The Dilemma of Organizational
Society (H. Ruitenbeek ed. 1963); W. Whyte, The Organization Man (1958).
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the tensions that have been generated by changes in the relations between the
public and private sectors of society. In a divided and militarized world where
expectations of violence persist, there has been a persistent trend toward greater
governmentalization, centralization, concentration, bureaucratization, and
regimentation. 7 4 Governments multiply functions in response to intensifying
demands upon public authorities. The tendency accelerates even in societies
which have traditionally been resistant to "encroachment" by the state. Within
nation states the centralized decisions are taken and implemented at the top
level of highly concentrated authority and control. This does not, however,
imply that a direct trend exists to centralize decisions in a world-inclusive
political organization. Since effective power in the global arena is monopolized
in the hands of nation-states, vested and sentimental interests oppose further
centralization, which would involve supra-national entities. Within any nation
state the concentration of authority and control in the hands of a few officials
or structures at a given level varies from one entity to another. The most
concentrated structure in a political arena is a hierarchy in which effective
decisions are made by one person and a limited number of advisors.
When there is a relatively low circulation of officials through a hierarchy, we
speak of bureaucracy. Governmentalizing, centralizing, and concentrating
tendencies foster hierarchy; and the stabilization of large hierarchies is almost
certain to spell bureaucracy. 7 5 Bureaucratization is typically followed by
regimentation, meaning that the state seeks to restrict all areas of-private and
individual as well as organized choice by using measures that depend on varying
degrees of coerciveness. It is often alleged that a new "organization man" has
emerged, a dedicated person who submerges his individuality to fit the
requirements of large scale action programs. 7 6 The trend toward governmental-
74 See H. Lasswell, National Security and Individual Freedom (1950); Lasswell, The
Garrison-State Hypothesis Today, in Changing Patterns of Military Politics 51-70 (S.
Huntington ed. 1962).
75 See generally P. Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy (2d ed. 1963); P. Blau & M.
Meyer, Bureaucracy in Modern Society (2d ed. 1971); M. Crozier, The Bureaucratic
Phenomenon (1964); A Sociological Reader on Complex Organizations (A. Etzioni ed.
1969); H. Jacoby, The Bureaucratization of the World (E. Kanes transl. 1976); Bureaucracy
and Political Development (J. LaPalombara ed. 2d ed. 1967); R. Merton, supra note 1, at
249-60; F. Morstein-Marx, The Administrative State: An Introduction to Bureaucracy
(1957); D. Silverman, The Theory of Organizations (1971); Weber, Bureaucracy, in From
Max Weber: Essays in Sociology 214 (H. Gerth & C. Mills eds. 1958); Bureaucracy
Explosion, U.S. News & World Rep., Aug. 16, 1976, at 22-26.
76 See W. Whyte, supra note 73.
In his analysis of the social structure of bureaucracy, Robert Merton indicates that
"the bureaucratic social structure exerts a constant pressure upon the individual to be
methodical, prudent, disciplined." As a consequence, "discipline, readily interpreted as
conformance with regulations, whatever the situation, is seen not as a measure designed for
specific purposes but becomes an immediate value in the life-organization of the
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ization-which is sustained by the associated syndromes of centralization,
concentration, bureaucratization, and regimentation-has upset the traditional
balance between the public and the private sector, and the change is largely at
the expense of civic order and personal autonomy. 7 7 In the extreme case, such
as a totalitarian regime, society is practically swallowed up by government.
7 8
Confronted with the frontal assaults of large scale organization and
especially of expanding governmentalization (with its associated syndromes),
-various counter-movements are set in motion. Popular demands are for less
governmentalization, less bureaucratization, less regimentation, and for more
decentralization and deconcentration, more spontaneity, and more personal
autonomy. They demand more widespread and effective participation, through
various strategies, in power and other value processes intended to make
government responsive and responsible. Where private organizations are fortified
by traditions of social diversity, the drift toward "big government" is rather
successfully opposed by vigorous private organizations. Wherever the established
political practice favors decentralization within government-as in a federal
system-any fundamental change in the structural balance is achieved with
difficulty. In consequence, the tension between the public and the private sector
persists; and the balance between the two is fluid, dynamic, and shifting.
7 9
bureaucrat ... develop[ing] into rigidities and an inability to adjust readily." R. Merton,
Social Theory and Social Structure 198, 199 (rev. ed. 1957).
The changing significance of bureaucratization is articulated by Daniel Bell in these
words:
In the broadest sense, the most besetting dilemma confronting all modern society is
bureaucratization, or the "rule of rules." Historically, bureaucratization was in part
an advance of freedom. Against the arbitrary and capricious power, say, of a
foreman, the adoption of impersonal rules was a guarantee of rights. But when an
entire world becomes impersonal, and bureaucratic organizations are run by
mechanical rules (and often for the benefit and convenience of the bureaucratic
staff), then inevitably the principle has swung too far.
D. Bell, supra note 26, at 119.
77 For the threat to personal autonomy posed by growing bureaucratization resulting
from the expanding role of government in various value-institutional sectors, see R. Nisbet,
Twilight of Authority (1975). See also McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, supra note 61.
78 As Bracher puts it:
Another important feature also distinguishing totalitarian systems from older forms
of dictatorship, is the degree to which individual and private life is controlled and
subjugated to a "new morality" of collective behavior. The regime demands quite
openly the complete politicizing of all realms of life, and its success in perfoming this
part of totalitarian control reveals the degree to which the regime is able to realize its
claim to fuse state and society, party and people, individual and collective into the
ideal of total unity.
Bracher, Totalitarianism, 4 Dictionary of the History of Ideas 406, 410 (P. Wiener
ed. 1974).
79 Within the Soviet world, on theother hand, while the elite structure has remained
tenaciously in favor of the formal principle of civilian supremacy, the Party continues to be
the major ladder up the authority and control pyramid. Within the Party, of course, it is the
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Crisis
The direction and rapidity of institutional change are closely linked to the
spread and intensity of the crises that accompany the evolution of an
interdependent world. Crises are situations in which impending large scale value
deprivations are expected, and, in which acute stress toward action is generated.
Crises exhibit many differing degrees in the intensity of expectation about the
threat of damage. In security crises all values are critically at stake. Obviously
the growing militarization of the world arena has pervasive and far-reaching
impacts upon the fulfillment and non-fulfillment of every value. It is
commonplace to acknowledge that humankind is today living in the shadow of
nuclear war and the possible annihilation of humanity and civilization. 8 0
Reflective minds recognize that the commonplaceness of this perception should
in no way dull the sense of the reality of danger. 8 1 A partial consequence of the
delicate balance of nuclear terror is that limited violence by private armies and
private groups has increased tremendously, and the destructive potentiality of
chemical and biological weapons is not neglected.8 2
specialist on the political-police function who has a distintic advantage, because central
power elements look to the police to protect them from the challenies that arise in a
totalitarian system. Established elites in such a system typically perceive themselves as
threatened by demands for decentralization, deconcentration, democratization, pluraliza-
tion and deregimentation. See M. Fainsod, Smolensk under Soviet Rule (1958); N. Leites & E.
Bernaut, Ritual of Liquidation (1954); B. Meissner & J. Reshefar, The Communist Party of
the Soviet Union (1956); The Soviet Secret Police (S. Wolin & R. Sluscr eds. 1957).
80 In the words of a Nobel laureate: "We live-while that is permitted us-in a balance of
terror. The United States and the Soviet Union together have already stockpiled nuclear
weapons with the explosive force of ten tons of TNT for every man, woman and child on
the earth." Wald, 'It Is Too Late for Declarations, for Popular Appeals', N. Y. Tines. Aug.
17, 1974, at 23, col. 1 (city ed.).
Cf. The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (B. Brodie ed. 1946): The
Effects of Nuclear Weapons (S. Glasstone ed. 1962): M. Halperin. Limited War in the
Nuclear Age (1963): H. Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (1960): H. Kissingcr, Nuclear
Weapons and Foreign Policy (1957); H. Kissinger, The Necessity Ibr Choice: Prospects of
American Foreign Policy (1962); T. Schelling & M. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control
(196 1);Arms, Defense Policy, and Arms Control, Daedalus, Summer 1975 (including articles
by Graham T. Allison, Les Aspin, Harvey Brooks, Barry Carter, Abram Chayes, Paul Doty,
Richard A. Falk, F.A. Long, Frederic A. Morris, G.W. Rathjens, Thomas C. Schelling,
Marshall D. Shulman, John Steinbruner, R. James Woolsey): Ikle, Can Nuclear Deterrence
Last Out the Century?, 51 Foreign Affairs 272 (1973); Note, The SALT Processand Its Use
in Regulating Mobile ICBM's, 84 Yale L.J. 1078 (1975).
81 For the continuing community concern for disarmament, see United Nations,
Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, The United Nations and Disarmament,
1945-1970 (1970); United Nations, Department of Political and Security Council Affairs,
The United Nations and Disarmament, 1970-1975 (1976); United Nations, Office of Public
Information, Disarmament: Progress Towards Peace (1974); United Nations, Comprehensive
Study of the Question of Nuclear- Weapon-Free Zones in All Its Aspects: Special Report of
the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, U.N. Doc. A/10027/Add. 1 (1976).
82 See J. Cookson & J. Nottingham, A Survey of Chemical and Biological Warjare
(1969); CBW-Chemical and Biological Warfare (S. Rose & D. Pavett eds. 1969); United
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The more important crises in the contemporary world can be analytically
related to every important value. Such an itemization would include:
Power-war, internal violence, breakdown in internal order;
Wealth-depression, speculative booms, rampant inflation, acute and wide-
spread poverty, acute shortage of food and other goods;
Well-being-epidemics, famines, and other natural disasters, and stress
created by overcrowding;
Enlightenment-the communications revolution, exposing many people to
the stress of new maps of man, environment, and nature, large-scale breakdown
in communication, systematic manipulation of information;
Skill-the rapid obsolescence of skill because of the technical revolution,
excessive automation and sudden displacement, critical shortages in educational
facilities and manpower, the brain drain;
Affection-the massive dislocations of the family caused by refugee
movements and by mass migration from rural to urban areas, vast increase in
unwanted children precipitated by the disintegration of the family;
Respect-confrontations between castes, classes, and ethnic groups,
collective defamation;
Rectitude-conflicts between the church and the state, conflicts between
different religions.
In the contemporary world crises in different value sectors (such as
expansion and contraction in wealth processes) become more severe and rapid.
Millions of human beings are exposed to contrasting life styles, conjoined with
the possibility of obtaining at least short range advantage by experimenting with
variations from the culture norms in which they were socialized. Sub-cultures of
mutual approbation spring into ephemeral and excited existence, only to
recluster around a new and equally transient model. Thousands of individuals
shift from one religious belief to another or from one secular ideology to
another. Millions have been soldiers, gangsters, refugees, prisoners, vagabonds,
and drifters. Millions have been unemployed, forced out of jobs by
technological change, converted to new and uncomprehended tasks, uprooted
from homes and shelters, jammed into crowded vehicles and moved in and out
Nations, Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their
Possible Use (1969); United Nations, Department of Political and Security Council Affairs,
Napahn and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of Their Possible Use (Report of
the Secretary-General), U.N. Doc. A/8803/Rev. 1 (1973); Larson, Biological Warfare: Model
1967, 46 Military Rev. 31 (1966); Meselson, Chemical and Biological Weapons, Scientific
American, May 1970, at 15-25.
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of confinement. The weapons of the nuclear age contribute to the death threat
that is permanently symbolized in the mushroom cloud over Hiroshima.
8 3
Critical to crises are the perceptions of the people involved. People must be
aware of intense demands and of the necessity to act before situations become
full-blown crises. The elites and the rank and file may diverge radically in their
perception of the same situation. Elite members are disposed to use crisis terms
prematurely in a developing situation as they attempt to secure popular support
and maintain their ascendancy. Real or imagined crises impel ruling elites to take
disproportionately severe measures. Elite overreactions take various forms:
initially justifiable measures of deprivations may be retained long after the
alleged crisis is over; excessive measures cause more destruction than conserva-
tion of values; arbitrary measures may bear no rational relation whatever to the
actual dangers involved in the alleged crisis. 8 4 Preoccupied with the task of
maintaining their ascendancy in a highly insecure world, elites may go beyond
the exploitation of crises to the fabrication of crises for exploitation. It is not
uncommon for harsh measures of deprivation and non-fulfillment to be justified
in the name of national security. It is notorious that many dictatorial regimes
have arbitrarily declared and maintained martial law (a "state of siege" or a
"state of emergency") as an excuse to suppress and liquidate dissenters and to
consolidate the regime.
8 5
In a world of instantaneous communication, crises are generated by the mass
media themselves through the use of sensationalism or over-reporting. 8 6 While
genuine crises may positively effect the mobilization of public support and
83 See R. Lifton, Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima (1968). See also Lifton, The
Hiroshima Connection, The Atlantic, Nov. 1975, at 83-88.
84 For instance, in India, what began in June 1975 as "temporary" authoritarian
measures adopted in the name of national security were, after 16 months, becoming
"permanent." These measures include tight press censorship, concentration of power,
suppression of dissents, and suspension of a parliamentary election. N. Y. Times, Nov. 8,
1976, at 1, col. 1 (city ed.).
For further background, see N.Y. Times, July 4, 1975, at 3, col. 1 (city ed.), id., Sept.
8, 1975, at 1, col. 1; id., Dec. 26, 1975, at 1, col 1; id, Sept. 15, 1976, at 18, col. 1; id.,
Nov. 3, 1976, at 45, col. 6. See also Nanda, The Constitutional Framework and the
Current Political COisis in India 2 Hastings Const. L. Q. 859 (1975); Indira's Next Decade,
Newsweek, Feb. 16, 1976, at 37-41.
85 See G. Kennedy, The Military in the Third World (1974); Military Profession and
Military Regimes (J. Van Doorn ed. 1969); Chile: The System of Military Justice, 15 Rev.
Int'l Comm'n Jurists 1 (1975); George, For Marcos, the Lesser Danger, Far Eastern
Economic Rev., Jan. 8, 1973, at 23-25; One More Infant Democracy Dies in the Cradle,
The Economist, Oct. 9, 1976, at 55; De Onis, Latin America, the Growing Graveyard for
Democracies, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1976, Se. 4, at 1, col. 4.
86 Boorstin has characterized this in terms of "a flood of pseudo-events." See D.
Boorstin, The Image, or What Happened to the American Dream 7-44 (1962). Cf
Tannenbaum & Lynch, Sensationalism: the Concept and Its Measurement, 37 Journalism
Q. 381 (1960).
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collective action, 8 7 the perpetual pseudo-crises fabricated by hyper-active mass
media may become so routinized as to interfere with the future capacity of the
media to arouse attention. Audiences may be so overwhelmed by sensational
trivialization as to become numbed, apathetic, impotent, and immobilized; they
may lose a legitimate sense of outrage, withdrawing effective identity with the
larger self, and remain unresponsive in times of genuine crisis.
8 8
Base Values
Potentially, all values-respect, power, enlightenment, well-being, wealth,
skill, affection, and rectitude-may be bases of power affecting deprivations and
fulfillments. In different contexts different participants in world social process
may employ any one or all of these values in imposing deprivation or seeking
fulfillment of human rights. The degree to which any given value is important in
a particular instance is a function of context.
Power is a principal base for nation-state officials, who typically utilize both
authority and effective control. The effective control at the disposal of these
officials is a combination of all values. Differences in the internal constitutive
processes of states bear directly upon the configuration of authority and
effective control. The degree to which authority and effective control are
concentrated or non-concentrated (totalitarian or democratic) affects the
patterns of deprivation and fulfillment. In recent times there has been a
tremendous expansion of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. By their nature
totalitarianism and authoritarianism involve the employment of authority
in deprivation of human rights: Totalitarian regimes are notorious for arrogating
all choices into the sphere of public order, and for exercising practically
unlimited authority over the value deprivation of individuals.
8 9 It must be
recognized that in polities that proclaim themselves to be democracies
87 The positive or negative effect of a crisis to an individual often depends upon
whether he experiences it singly or collectively. Such communal disasters as a flood or an
earthquake can have various beneficial effects upon individuals involved. For instance,
physical illnesses may suddenly disappear and altruism may prevail upon selfishness.
88 Given the complexities of contemporary life and the media overload, people,
including the educated, may become so bewildered as to be indifferent and lose the capacity
for outrage and commitment in the face of massive atrocities and deprivations. This state of
affairs is in turn apt for exploitation by ruling elites. Similarly, there is danger, amidst
abiding parochialism, of contributing to the strength of a local development by magnifying
its significance, and hence enhancing its appeal to other local elements who share nothing
more tangible than a generalized resentment against outsiders, and the assumption that what-
ever worries the foreigners deserves support.
Cf. Baker, Stomach-Bulge Defense, N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1975, at 29, col. 1 (city ed.):
Baker, After the Flood, id., Apr. 19, 1975, at 31, col. I.
For assessment of the implications of "communication overload," see D. Bell, supra
note 26, at 316-17; A. Toffler, supra note 30, at 350-55.
89 On totalitarianism, see generally H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (1958);
K. Bracher, The German Dictatorship (1970); H. Buchheim, Totalitarian Rule: Its Nature
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individuals may at times be victimized by the misuse and abuse of authority.
Governmental officials may act without authority, under pretended authority,
or under auth'brity incompatible with human dignity; they may exercise
authority arbitrarily to impose deprivations and deny fulfillment. 90 In extreme
cases, law may be perverted into an instrument of oppression.
Participants in the world social process who are not state officials may, of
course, draw upon authoritative decisions as power assets in support of their
activities. Primarily, however, non-governmental participants depend on values
other than power (notably wealth, knowledge, and skill). The degree to which
individuals are vulnerable to deprivation and are capable of achieving the
fulfillment of their human rights depends largely upon the kind of public order
system-totalitarian, authoritarian, or democratic-in which they live and the
base values at their disposal. The degree to which authority is available for the
defense of human rights, especially in challenge of deprivations, varies
substantially from community to community. 9 1
The distribution of base values within the world social process obviously
conditions the deprivation and fulfillment of values. The influence extends to
the distribution among and within states. As between states, the distribution is
glaringly discrepant. Within a particular state, discrepancy extends not only to
power and wealth but also to all other values which comprise effective power.
Many countries have an abundance of resources and potential values, while
others appear almost hopelessly deprived. Thus important technology is still
monopolized by the developed countries; nuclear power and other technology
are still closely held. New scientific discoveries, technological developments,
and access to the outer space are bases for only a few communities. There
has been increasing recognition of the importance of knowlegde and skill as
and Characteristics (R. Hein transl. 1968): B. Chapman. Police Stare (1970): C. Firiedrich &
Z. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocraci' (1961 ): C. Fricdrich. NI. Curtis. & 13.
Barber, Totalitarianism in Perspective: Three Views (1969): I. I:romm. Escape .l0on
Freedom (1941-1965): F. Hayek, The Road to Seidom (1944): S. Neumann. Permanent
Revolution: Totalitarianism in the Age of International Civil War (2d ed. 1965): W. Reich.
The Alass Psychology of Facism (1946): L. Schapiro. Totalitarianism (1972): J. Talmon. The
Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (1960): I':. Tannenbaum. The Iacist ExAvpriencec Italian
Society and Culture 1922-1945 (1972): Totalitarianism (C. I:riedrich ed. 1964): I'orld
Revolutionarv Elites. Studies in Coercive Ideological illorenents (H. Lasswcll & D. Lerner
eds. 1966).
90 IFor abuse of power associated with the WVatergate syndrome. see IWateigate: Special
Prosecution Force Report (October, 1975) (containing a detailed bibliography of Waterga tc
source materials); Hearings and Final Reports puirsuiant to H. Res. 803. of the house Comn.
on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (Impeachment Hearings). See also J. Dean,
Blind Ambition: The While House Years (1976); L. Jaworski, The Right and the Power: The
Prosecution of Watergate (1976);E. Richardson, The Creative Balance: Government,
Politics, and the Individual in America's Third Century 1-47 (1976). See also note 11 supra.
91 Cf/* e-... V. Chalidze, To Defend These Rights. tuhnan Rights and the Soiviet Union
(G. Daniels transl. 1974): T. Taylor, et al, Onrts ol Terror: Soviet Crimial Justice amid
Jewish Emigration (1976).
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bases of power; but these values are not widely and evenly spread about the
globe. The cumulative result is the deep disparities between have and have-not
countries (as summarized in North-South division). 9 2 Consequently, such
countries differ in priority and direction in their respective programs for
facilitating various human rights.
9 3
The uneven distribution of values and resources as between territorial
communities is carried forward within even the best of states. Within many
national communities disparities in the distribution of wealth and other values
are a commonplace phenomenon. The disparity is especially pronounced in the
relationship between the power elite and the rank and file. While ruling elites
tend to achieve overwhelming power, the masses of people remain powerless.
The masses, in whose name the elite rules, become more often than not mere
objects of deprivation rather than subjects of fulfillment, whatever the official
rhetoric may allege.
In the light of the structure of effective power in the contemporary world,
it is certain that no individual can control sufficient base values to be immune
from deprivations emanating from various sources and to achieve the utmost
fulfillment of values. Every individual depends upon the groups (nation-state,
political party, union, trade association, educational institution, church, family,
and so on) of which he is a member for his value position.
In examining the entire spectrum of base values available for value
92 In the words of Lester Brovn:
In et cct, our world today is in reality two worlds, one rich, one poor: one litcrate.
one largely illiterate: one industrial and urban, one agrarian aid rural: one overfed
and overweight, one hungry and malnourished ;one affluent and consumption-oriented,
one poverty-stricken and survival-oriented. North of this line, life expectancy at birth
closely approaches the Biblical threescore and ten; south of it, many do not survive
infancy. In the North, economic opportunities are plentiful and social mobility is high.
In the South, economic opportunities are scarce and societies are rigidly stratified.
L. Brown, World Without Borders 41 (1973).
See generally C. Icensman, Rich Against Poor: The Reality of Aid (1971): J. Pincus,
Trade, Aid and Development: the Rich and Poor Nations (1967); The Gap Between Rich
and Poor Nations (G. Ranis ed. 1972): P. Uri, Development Without Dependence (1976): B.
Ward, The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations (1962): The Widening Gap: Development in
the 1 970's (B. Ward, J. Runnalls, & L. D'anjou eds. 1971 ); Barraclough, The Haves and the
Have Nots, N.Y. Rev. Books, May 13, 1976, at 31-41; Hansen, 71e Political Economy of
North-South Relations: How Much Change?, 29 Int'l Org. 921 (1975); Reisman, The Third
World's Fading Dream, The Nation, June 12. 1976. at 716-20.
93 lFor some of the pertinent issues raised, see the statements and comments made at
the panel on Economic Development and Human Rights: Brazil, Chile, and Cuba, [1973]
Proceedings Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 198. See also M, Ganji, The Realization of Economic, Social
anid Cultural Rights. Problems, Policies, Progress, U.N. Doec. I£/CN.4/ 108/Rev. I
(E/CN.4/1131/Rev. 1) (1975): Humian Rights and the 'Single Standard' (editorial), N.Y.
Times. Jan. 1I, 1977, at 32, col. I (city ed.).
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deprivations and indulgences, special attention must be given to the unique
position of science-based technology. The impact of technology on the
fulfillment and deprivations of values is widely felt and appreciated. Great
contributions have of course been made to human rights by the technology
which has eliminated so much physical labor (depending upon political power
and social structure) and released tremendous manpower and leisure for creative
and rich pursuits of values. On the other hand, increasing threats to human rights
have obviously come from the spectacular developments of modern science and
technology. These threats may be exemplified in multiple detail, including such
items as: the sophisticated techniques of physical, psychological, and data
surveillance that penetrate the traditional zones of privacy and jeopardize the
very core of personal autonomy; 94 the reign of terror made possible by modem
weapons; the horrible techniques of torture that dehumanize, intimidate and
oppress; 9 5 the routinization of work caused by widespread automation; 9 6
the absolescence of skill caused by the technical revolution; and the
ambivalent potentialities of the burgeoning science and technology of genetic
engineering.
9 7
94 See A. Miller, The Assault on Privacy: Computers, Data Banks, and Dossiers 1971);
Privacy and Human Rights (A. Robertson ed. 1973); A. Westin, Privacy and Freedom
(1968); A Westin & M. Baker, Databanks ina Free Society: Computers, Record-Keeping and
and Privacy (1972). For further references, see McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, supra note 61.
In his classic study, Edward T. Hall observes that a person exists, in effect, within an
invisible bubble of "personal space," which varies in size from individual to individual,
depending upon his personality, his culture, and other situational factors in a particular
context. See E'. Hall, The Hidden Dimension (1966).
95 See Report on Torture, supra note 72, at 39-69. See also Hearings on Human Rights
in Chile Before the Subconm. on Inter-A merican Affairs and on International Organizations
and Movements of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974);
Hearings on Torture and Oppression in Brazil Before the Subcomm. on International
Organizations and Movements of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974); Baraheni, Terror in Iran, N.Y. Rev. Books, Oct. 28, 1976, at 21-25; Colligan, New
Science of Torture, Science Digest, July 1976, at 44-49; Human Rights in the World:
Torture Continues, 10 Rev. Int'l Comm'n Jurists 10 (1973); Shelton, The Geography of
Disgrace: A World Survey of Political Prisoners, Saturday Rev./World, June 15, 1974, at 14
et seq.; Styron, Torture in Chile, The New Republic. March 20, 1976, at 15-17; Styron,
Uruguay: The Oriental Republic, The Nation, Aug. 14, 1976, at 107-11; Torture as Policy:
The Network of Evil, Time, Aug. 16, 1976, at 31-34.
96 See Automation and Technological Change (J. Dunlop ed. 1962); International
Labor Office, Automation and Non-Manual Workers (1967); A. Jaffe & J. Froomkin,
Technology and Jobs: Automation in Perspective (1968); C. Silberman & others, The Myths
of Automation (1966); Hoffer, Automation Is Here to Liberate Us, in Techology and Social
Change 64-74 (W. Moore ed. 1972).
97 Cf] J. Fletcher, The Ethics of Genetic Control: Ending Reproductive Roulette
(1974); P. Ramsey, The Ethics of Fetal Research (1975); P. Ramsey, Fabricated Man
(1971); Genetics and the Future of Man (J. Roslansky ed. 1966); Human Rights and
Scientific and Technological Development, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1173 (1975) (Report of the
World Health Organization to UN Commission on Human Rights).
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As modern science and technology move toward universality, certain
uniformities are imposed upon world attention, and attitudes are molded in
similar ways. Long a monopoly of Western Europe, modern science and
technology are spreading throughout the globe, although at present inhibited by
factors that find expression through the contending systems of public order.
Certain consequences follow inexorably from the appearance in a community of
the "machine," or modern techno-scientific complex. The machine, with all the
problems it brings, confers a sense of mastery. Even those who at first are
mastered do not fail to observe and presently to admire the impersonal strength
and precision of mechanical, electrical, and other forms of energy applied to
production. On the basis of direct experience, certain inferences sprout into
belief and harden into faith, such as the speculation that if the brain of man can
grasp and shape the hidden dynamics of Nature, man is capable of controlling
himself and his gadgets for the common good. This inference comes not from
propaganda or pedagogy alone, or even principally; rather it rises from indelible
impressions left by association with man's handiwork. From glimpses of the
possible develop demands that authority be induced or coerced to make
whatever provision is necessary to share the fruits of knowledge with the
"common man." However supine the traditional outlook of any culture, contact
with the machine touches off a dynamic approach to life. 98
Strategies
The strategies employed by both deprivors and deprivees to manage base
values in the pursuit of their objectives in the shaping and sharing of values
embrace the wnole range of possible instruments of policy. All the different
types of strategy-commonly characterized as diplomatic, ideological, economic,
98 For a provocative, penetrating analysis of thc contemporary technical civilization
that borders on "technological determinism", see J. Ellul, The Technological Society (J.
Wilkinson transl. 1964). In Ellul's words:
Technique has penetrated the deepest recesses of the human being. The machine
tends not only to create a new human environment, but also to modify man's very
essence. The milieu in which he lives is no longer his. He must adapt himself.as
though the world were new, to a universe for which he was not created.
Id. at 325.
For differing views, see V. Ferkiss, Technological Mat: The Al'vth and the Realit,
(1969); H. Muller, The Children of Frankenstein: A Primer on Modern Technology and
Human Values (1970); L. Mumford, The Pentagon of Power (1970).
See also L. Berkner, The Scientific Age: The Inpact of Science on Society (1964): G.
Foster, Traditional Cultures and the Impact of Technological Change (1962): Technology
and Social Change (W. Moore ed. 1972); L. Mumford, The Myth of the Machine: Technics
and Human Development (1967); L. Mumford, Technics and Civilization (1963): C.
Haskins, The Scientific Revolution and World Politics (1964): D. Loth & M. Ernst, The
Taming of Technology (1972); Modern Technology and Civilization (C. Walker ed. 1962);
Lasswell, The Political Science of Science: An Inquiry into the Possible Reconciliation of
Mastery and Freedom, 50 Am. Pol. Sc. Rev. 961 (1956).
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and military-are employed, singly and in varying combinations, with many
differing degrees of coerciveness and persuasiveness. 9 9 Each particular type of
strategy differs in terms of the degree to which it relies upon symbols or material
resources. Diplomacy in the broadest sense depends primarily upon symbols in
the form of offers, counter-offers and agreements (deals) among elite figures.
Ideological strategV also uses symbols as the principal means of action, its
distinctiveness being communications directed to large audiences. 10 0 Economic
instruments involve goods and services; military strategy employs means of
violence and destruction. While diplomacy and ideology are especially concerned
with perspectives, economic and military instruments are based upon capabili-
ties. No instrument, however, is restricted to its most distinctive modality.
Similarly, any organization primarily specialized to one instrument finds it
expedient to make use of all. Every strategy can be employed, singly or in
combination with other strategies, for productive, constructive purposes as well
as for deprivational, destructive purposes.
Agreements (deals) of various types are made by group participants as well
as individuals with varying degrees of explicitness and reciprocity. Deals are
frequently made by governmental officials, business tycoons, gang leaders, and
so on. As interaction accelerates about the globe, there would appear a new
intensity in the use of agreements of all kinds to promote the shaping and
sharing of values. Given the ubiquity of the effective power processes operating
at all levels of communities and organizations, it is no surprise that practices of
deprivations and non-fulfillment are frequently effected through secret, as well
as overt, deals of one kind or another. Among the elite who engage in such
practice there is of course a shared expectation of silence and reciprocity-a
consensus about not asking too many questions.
Improved techniques in communication enhance potential not only for a
richer and wider fulfillment of values but also for deprivations. Such
99 Some violence may be done to ordinary usage when one speaks of the diplomatic.
ideological, economic and military strategies of some of the participants whom we have
identified in the world arcna, or when we refer to the internal rather than to external arenas.
The most obvious discrepancies are in reference to the stategies of an individual. We do not
usually think of a person as engaged in diplomacy when he is negotiating a deal on his own
behalf. Nor do we speak of the use of propaganda by an individual to advance a private
project as an example of "ideological" strategy. It is more in tune with everyday discourse
to assess someone's private "economic" policies. Moreover, the term "military" seems to
overstate the degree of control that the individual exercises over destructive instruments
which lie employs for private purposes. We accept these inconveniences to underscore that
strategies operate with the same values as bases whether the objectives sought are identified
with the "primary ego" or with the larger self shared by a collectivity.
100 C..1 L. Fraser, Propaganda (1957); B. Murty, Propaganda and World Public Order:
The Legal Regulation of the Ideological Instrument of Coercion (1968): J. Whitton & A.
Larson, Propaganda: Towards Disarmament in the War o1 Words (1963): Lasswell.
Propaganda, 12 Encyc. Soc. Sc. 521 (1934).
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deprivational potentiality has been manifested in various ways. In many
communities in which the media of mass communication are more or less
monopolized by power elites, the gathering, processing, and dissemination of
information are made a deliberate and vital instrument of thought conditioning
and coerced conformity; generally, censorship prevails, information may be
fabricated, distorted, restricted, and blocked out, and non-conforming opinions
are suppressed.' 0 1 In parallel, in some communities in which the media of mass
communication are concentrated in the hands of wealth elites, the gathering,
processing and dissemination of information tend to be dominated by profit
considerations and colored by inordinate commercialism, thereby debasing the
quality of enlightenment.' 0 2 Under contemporary conditions, the ideological
instrument is often closely associated with instruments of physical destruction.
It has, further, accentuated the sense of relative deprivation and non-fulfill-
ment. 1 03 To minimize the deepening sense of relative deprivation and
non-fulfillment, power elites in relatively closed societies take measures to
prevent and interfere with the flow of information from dangerous or
"undesirable" sources (both internal and external) and to .restrict the free
movement of people both beyond and within national boundaries.1
0 4
It may be noted that, despite the difficulty in gaining effective access to the
mass media, deprivees have increasingly resorted to the ideological instrument
(the mass media of communication) to dramatize their grievances and aspirations
and to gain wider attention (locally, nationally, regionally, or globally).' 0 5 The
politically persecuted, when denied internal channels of attention, seek to gain
attention and support through the available media abroad.' 
0 6
101 See C. Friedrich & Z. Brzezinski, supra note 89, at 107-17; A. Sakharov, Progress,
Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom 62-65 (The New York Times transl. 1968); H. Smith,
supra note 64, at 344-74; Press Freedom 1970-1975, 16 Rev. Int'l Comm'n Jurists 45 (1976);
Reston, The Condition of the Press in the World Today (1), 7 Human Rights J. 593 (1974).
102 See E. Epstein, News from Nowhere: Television and the News 78-130 (1973); N.
Johnson, How to Talk Back to Your Television Set (1970); J. Merrill & R. Lowenstein,
Media, Messages and Alen: New Perspectives in Communication 79-88 (1971); Editors of the
Atlantic Monthly, The American Media Baronies, in Sociology in the World Today 89-96 (J.
Kinch ed. 1971).
103 F'or development of the theme of relative deprivation, see T. Gurr, Why Men Rebel
(1971).
104 See V. Chalidze, supra note 91, at 92-114; W. Korey, The Soviet Cage:
Anti-Semitisn in Russia 184-200 (1973); Z. Medvedev, The Medvedev Papers 173-270 (V.
Rich transl. 1971): A. Sakharov, My Country and the World 51-61 (G. Daniels transl. 1975):
H. Smith, supra note 64, at 344-74, 464-88.
105 See Protest and Discontent (B. Crick & W. Robson eds. 1970); S. Eisenstadt,
Modernization. Protest and Change 31-35, 61-64, 74-75, 104-09 (1966); The Politics of
Confontation (S. Hendel ed. 1971).
106 The controversy concerning the emigration of Soviet Jews is a well known
example.
Cf. Amnesty International, Annual Report 1974/75 (1975); P. Litvinov, The Trial of
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Goods and services may of course be managed to impose deprivations not
only of wealth, but also of all other values. Individuals are highly vulnerable to
deprivations stemming from the manipulation and withholding of goods and
services. The breakup of family and traditional organizations in the production
of goods and services (especially rural organizations) makes the individual largely
dependent upon a new economic system against which the lone-individual is
commonly powerless.' 07 The damage that can be done by mismanagement of
goods and services is recently exemplified in the rampant corrupt practices of
bribery in many parts of the world.' 
0 8
In an insecure world of persisting expectations of violence, many people
(elite and non-elite alike) not only expect violence, but preach violence, as the
key to solution of human miseries, injustices and inequalities (transnationally
and nationally). 1 0 9 Convinced that their ascendancy depends upon a monopoly
of the organization and means of violence and destruction, power elites in many
communities have achieved high degrees of concentration and control. It is such
monopoly that enables many dictatorial regimes and military juntas to stay in
power despite intense popular resentment and opposition; overwhelmed by a
vast network of terror, as buttressed by the modem military, para-military, and
police organizations of the state, individuals have little choice but to conform
and be silent.1 10
Despite widespread attempts by power elites to monopolize the means of
violence, the fact remains that the cheapness and easy availability of military
hardware have put violence and terror at the disposal, not merely of state elites,
but of individuals and small groups as well. This has made possible a
transnational network of terror and has enhanced the danger and range of
deprivation and destruction.
1 1 1
the Four (P. Reddaway ed. 1972): T. Taylor, supra note 91; Scoble & Wiseberg, Human
Rights and A ,nnesty International. 413 The Annals 11 (1974).
107 Karl Polanyi maintains that the emergence of the "market mentality" under the
laissez-faire climate of the Industrial Revolution led to a fundamental change in the
relationship between the public and the private sector. See K. Polanyi, The Great Trans-
formation (1944).
108 See note 19 supra.
109 A well-worn quotation of Mao Tse-tung typifies this expectation: "Political power
grows out of the barrel of a gun."
Cf. K. Lang, Military Institutions and the Sociology of War (1972). Cf. also American
Violence (R. Brown ed. 1970);Assassination and Political Violence (J. Kirkham, S. Levy, &
W. Crotty eds. 1970) (A Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention
of Violence); G. Sorel, Reflections on Violence (1961); Violence: An Element of A merican
Life (K. Taylor & F. Soady cds. 1972): F. von der Mehden, Comparative Political Violence
(1973).
110 See I. Bramstedt, Dictatorship and Political Police: The Technique of Control by
Fear (1945). See also note 89 supra.
111 See note 23 supra. See also M. Willrich & T. Taylor, Nuclear Theft: Risks and
Safeguards (1974): Howard, Terrorists: How They Operate a Worldwide Network, Parade,
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Outcomes
The outcomes of the process of interaction are a continuing flow of
deprivations and fulfillment with regard to all values, as manifested in variable
patterns of value accumulation and distribution. From a long historical
perspective, it would appear that just as science and technology move toward
universalization, so the overall trend is toward the wider shaping and sharing of
major values, despite zigzag patterns occuring at different times and in different
communities. Yet, the contemporary world has scarcely begun to mobilize its
full potential to fulfill the rising common demands of humankind; though the
nature, scope and magnitude of the values at stake differ from one community
to another and from one occasion to another, large-scale value deprivations and
non-fulfillments of individuals and pluralistic groups continue to prevail.
Deprivation and non-fulfillment appear to characterize the value institutional
processes of vast segments of the world's population, and a rich flow of
fulfillment is enjoyed by only a small segment of that population. In a previous
article, we have already itemized in summary outline the flow of deprivations
and non-fulfillment in regard to all values, by reference to the distinctive
features of each of the value processes.
1 12
Because of the interdependences brought about by accelerating changes in
science and technology (particularly in communication), in population growth,
in the demands and identifications of peoples, and in techniques of organization,
there continue to be rising, common demands among peoples about the world
for the greater production and wider sharing of all the basic values and an
increasing perception by them of their inescapable interdependence in the
shaping and sharing of all such demanded values. 1 1 3 Peoples everywhere (elites
and non-elites alike), while cherishing parochial identifications, are also
exhibiting increasing identifications with larger and larger groups, gradually
extending to the whole of humankind. In an earth-space arena in which
predispositional and environmental factors are in constant interplay, and in
Jan. 18, 1976, at 14 et seq.; Laqueur, The Futility of Terrorism, Harper's Magazine, March
1976, at 99-105; New Haven Register, Sept. 17, 1972, at 24G, col. 1 ("Terrorists With
Atomic Bomb Could Hold World for Ransom").
See also Fisk, The World's Terrorists Sometimes Are United, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17,
1975, Sec. 4, at 3, col. 3; Middlcton, Could a U.S. Atom Bomb Be Stolen?, id., Sept. 22,
1974, Sec. 4, at 3, col. 3; id., July 23, 1976, at A2, col. 3 ("Terrorists' Techniques Improve,
and So Do Efforts to Block Them"); id., July 16, 1976, at 1, col. 1 (city ed.) ("Libyans
Arm and Train World Terrorists").
112 For the itemization and ample documentation of the flow of deprivations and
non-fulfillments in regard to all values, see McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, supra note 3.
113 For further elaboration, see id. An eloquent statement on global interdependences
is: An Introduction by R. Buckminster Fuller, in E. Higbee, A Question of Priorities: New
Strategies for Our Urbanized World xvii-xxxiv (1970).
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which mass destructive means intimidate and threaten humankind and civiliza-
tion, no people can fully be secure unless all peoples are secure. Even in these
days of wars and revolution, and of genocide and arbitrary internal violence, the
basic interrelationship of human rights and security (peace) is not difficult to
discern: that interrelationship is one, not of contraposition or indifference, but
rather of an interdependence so comprehensive and intense as to approximate
identity.1 14 In increasingly common conception human rights and peace
(security) are today regarded, not as static and independent absolutes or vague
and utopian goals, but rather as the shared aspirations of peoples engaged in a
cooperative community enterprise and inspired both by identifications with the
whole of humankind and by realistic perceptions of a complete interdetermina-
tion in the achievement of such aspirations. Even when conceived in the minimal
sense of freedom from the fact and expectation of arbitrary violence and
coercion, peace is increasingly observed to be dependent upon maintaining
people's expectations that the processes of effective decision in public order will
be responsive to their demands for a reasonable access to all the values
commonly characterized as those of human dignity or of a free society.' 15
When peace is more broadly conceived as security in position, expectation, and
potential with regard to all basic community values, the interrelationship of
peace and human rights quite obviously passes beyond that of interdependence
and, as suggested, approaches that of identity. To President John F. Kennedy's
question: "Is not peace, in the last analysis, basically a matter of human
rights? " there can be but one rational answer. In the light of all the pervasive
interconnections of both predispositional and environmental factors, as previ-
ously elaborated, it would appear incontestable that in today's world, without a
more secure peace and continuing expectations of peace, there can be little hope
of an improved and sustained protection of human rights and, conversely, that
114 See note 113 supra. See also McDougal & Leighton, The Rights of Man in the World
Community: Constitutional Illusions Versus Rational Action, 14 Law & Contenp. Prob.
490 (1949), reprinted in M. McDougal & Associates, Studies in World Public Order 335,
335-43 (1960); McDougal & Bebr, Human Rights in the United Nations. 58 Am. J. lnt'l L.
603, 603-08 (1964); Toth, Human Rights and World Peace, in I Renie Cassilt Ainiornn
Discipuloruinque Liber 362-82 (Institut International des Droits de I'Hommc cd. 1969).
115 Dismissing the trap of "a semantic jungle" that tends to "identify security with
exclusively'military phenomena and most particularly with military hardware.'" McNamara
conceives security in broad terms of "development" in the contemporary modernizing
context:
In a modernizing society security means development. Security is not military
hardware, though it may involve it; security is not traditional military activity,
though it may encompass it. Security is development, and without development there
can be no security. A developing nation that does not, in fact, develop simply
cannot remain secure for the intractable reason that its own citizenry cannot shed its
human nature.
R. McNamara, The Essence of Security, 150, 149 (1968).
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without a more extensive protection of human rights, there can be little realistic
hope of a better peace.
The comprehensive world social process, which includes the processes of all
its componet communities from local to global and which determines the
degree to which individuals can achieve their demanded values through time, is a
dynamic and changing, not static and changeless, process. It embraces the whole
manifold of historic events, extending from the past, to the present, and to the
future. In this comprehensive process, each feature is constantly changing and
interacting with the other features:
participants are constantly changing in characteristics, as they affect, and are
affected by, the changing variables of culture, class, interest, personality, and
crisis;
the perspectives of participants are in continuous flux and revision in the light of
changing conditions-they shift in the intensity and scope of their demands,
expand or contract their identifications, and modify their world views and maps
of reality;
changing dimensions of time, space, institutionalization and crisis exert constant
pressures on the situation of interaction;
the significance of resources and other base values, extending from the earth to
the outer space, continues to change under the impact of science and
technology;
strategies are employed and manipulated in varying combinations to cope with
ever changing contexts;
and the varied outcomes find expression in changing aggregate patterns of value
accumulation and distribution and in differing impacts on different individuals,
groups and communities.
The impacts of this ongoing process of deprivation and fulfillment of values
reach beyond immediate deprivees and deprivors, affecting in the long run the
aggregate patterns in innovation, diffusion and restriction of value-institutional
practices at all levels of communities (local, national, regional, and global) in the
earth-space arena. Beyond even living generations, impacts extend to all future
generations of humankind; ultimately at stake is the entire pattern of balance or
imbalance among people, institutions, resources, technology, and the eco-
system. 116
116 In the words of Secrctary-Gcneral Kurt Waldheim:
One of the most unfortunate aspects of modern society is the increasing tendency
to scc problems solely in immediate terms. We are fascinated and obsessed by the
suddenness and drama of events; we seldom look deeply into their causes, and hardly
ever into those elements which could lead to future crises. Yet the Roman adage that
great disputes often result from small events but never from small causes rcmains
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Given this dynamism of change inherent in the world social process, with its
constant feedback of the flow of continuing events, immediate value outcomes,
and long-term consequences, it is apparent that rational inquiry about world
social process requires a continuing, systematic monitoring by reference to each
of its main features. 1 1 7 This monitoring and appraising task is indispensable to
the creation and maintenance of a continuing map of the interactions that
constitute the events from which claims for freedom from deprivations and for
value fulfillments emanate, and to which the process of authoritative decision
responds. A continuing monitoring of the world social process which would
present a dynamic world map with adequate comprehensiveness, selectivity, and
realism would enhance effective performance of all the necessary intellectual
tasks-clarification of goals, description of trends, analysis 'of conditioning
factors, future projection and recommendation of alternatives-necessary to
facilitate and optimalize the defense and fulfillment of human rights.
absolutely valid. The majority of the great issues that confront mankind are
profound, complex, and, above all, long-term problems. They cannot be resolved
swiftly or dramatically; they are closely interrelated; and they bear directly upon the
lives of all. For the great problems are the global problems, and they require a
concerted global approach.
Waldheim, Toward Global Interdependence, Saturday Rev./World, Aug. 24, 1974, at 63.
117 See Snyder, Hermann, & Lasswell, A Global Monitoring System: Appraising the
Effects of Government on Human Dignity 20 Int'l Studies Q. 221 (1976). Cf Lasswell,
Toward Continuing Appraisal of the Impact of Law on Society, 21 Rutgers L. Rev. 645
(1967).
To keep abreast of the changing context of world social process, it is vital to improve
the coverage provided by surveys of trends that use relatively "extensive" methods of
continuous observations. More "intensive" studies need to be made periodically to disclose
changing "predispositions" in depth. For a research design of the kind required, though
adapted to another field, see Brodbeck & Jones, Television Viewing and Norm- Violating
Practices and Perspectives of Adolescents: A Synchronized Depth and Scope Program of
Policy Research, in Television and Human Behavior 98-135 (L. Arons & M. May eds. 1963).

TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF CONTROL
Dora Neva res-Muhi iz*
Introduction
Any attempt to develop a general theory of control should consider: a) The
etiology and historical emergence of control systems1 and institutions;
2 b) the
character of control; and c) definitions and processing of deviance
3 within
society.
Control systems and institutions are viewed by this student both as a
reflection of society and as a device to achieve political and economic goals at a
particular historical moment. Therefore, the present paper posits, and shall
further demonstrate a reciprocal relationship between society and control
institutions and systems. The main vector for the study of control will thus be
the nature of society. The concept of the nature of self will be a secondary
vector.
Conceptual Framework
It is our premise that historically America is becoming a totalitarian
society. 4 Thus, its control institutions (total or partial) are not only a reflection
*Assistant Professor, School of Law, Inter American University; B.A., I.D.,
University of Puerto Rico; M.A., Center for Studies in Criminology and Criminal Law,
University of Pennsylvania; a former student of Dr. Helen Silving.
1 A control system is understood within the context of this paper as the set of
practices, relationships, beliefs, and institutions utilized by the infrastructure to impose and
maintain both its ideology and political order.
2 Control institutions are the physical or symbolic social structures which serve as the
instrumental expression of the control system.
3 Deviance is the act of challenging the operation of society toward its fundamental
goals. Historically deviants have been divided into two major groups: social dynamite
(criminal deviant) and social junk (insanes, retardates, old ages).
4 Hereinafter the terms totalitarian society and total society will be used as
synonymous.
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of this phenomenon but assume characteristics similar to those of the total
society.
A total institution may be defined as "a place of residence and work where
a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an
appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered
round of life". 5 Adopting Goffman's categorical division, 6 total institutions can
be classified as:
a) Institutions to protect the community against those who are considered
intentional harmers, e.g,. jails, penintentiaries, P.O.W. camps, concentration
camps. Also juvenile detention centers.
b) Places established to care for pesons felt to be both incapable of looking
after themselves and a threat to the community, e.g., T.B. sanitaria, mental
hospitals or asylums, and leprosaria.
c) Institutions established to care for persons both incapable and harmless,
e.g., homes for the blind, the aged, the orphaned, and the indigent.
d) Institutions established to pursue an instrumental work-like task, e.g.,
army barracks, ships, work-camps, colonial compounds; and
e) Retreats from the world, e.g., abbeys, convents, monasteries, and other
cloisters.
Apart from total institutions there also exist partial control institutions.
These institutions, similarly called social institutions, are physical (e.g., schools,
work place, church) or non-physical (e.g., family, sports, media) structures
which exert control upon certain areas of human activity.
The phenomenon of deviance processing within society exists in a dialectical
relationship With control. Due to this dynamic relationship both the definitions
of deviance and the nature of control have changed historically according to the
goals of the political and economic structure. 7
A total society is that which attempts to encompass all the areas of activities
of its members. In this society the productive apparatus determines the socially
needed occupations, skills and attitudes, also individual needs and aspirations. 8
The values are those created by the political and ideological structure. 9 The state
and the society become one and the same. Control is increasingly transferred
5 I'rving Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and
Other Inmates (New York: Anchor, 1961 ) p. 1.
6 Id., pp. 4-5.
7 See Stcvcn Spitzer, "Toward a Marxian Theory of Deviance", Social Problems
(June 1975) p. 638. Although this author refers to this relationship as reciprocal, we prefer
to call it dialectical, due to its dynamic nature.
8 See Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).
9 See Jules Henry, Culture Against Man (New York: Vintage, (1965).
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from the organs of civil society to the organs of political society, i.e., the
state.' 0 Also, control becomes more subtle with increasing reliance placed on
psychological forces, such as, feelings of automation, atomization, alienation,
intimidation, and terror. It also operates in anticipation of deviance.
In a total society, social ingtitutions (e.g., family, schools, sports, etc.) are
turned into means of political, ideological, and economic control, while total
institutions-the ultimate form of control over people-function as a comple-
ment to partial institutions in encompassing human activities. Such a total
society becomes irrational and closed to alternatives, although control is vested
with a semblance of rationality. In essence, this shall be the framework within
which some insights toward a general theory of control will be offered.
Etiology and Historical Emergence of Control Systems and Institutions
The study of the etiology and evolution of control will lead us to explore
the following issues: a) how the nature of society gives rise to particular groups
of people who become the subject of institutionalized control; b) how particular
models of control respond to the political, economic, and ideological organiza-
tion within society; and c) why segregated control institutions emerge.
A joint consideration of these issues-due to their reciprocal relationship-
will be employed in the development of our paradigm. Our steppingstone will be
the two principal paradigms that have been used in the study of the historical
evolution of control, i.e., functional idealism and historical materialism.
According to the functional perspective, social control (i.e., punishment)
emerges from the underlying structure of beliefs. The moral beliefs system is
considered primary, while the political structure is randomly related to the
evolution of punishment and society. Accordingly, responses to deviant behavior
"will move increasingly toward reliance on restitution rather than repression as
societies become increasingly technologized, complex and heterogeneous."' 1 1 As
collective sentiments-which are very strong in simple communities-weaken, the
focus of the offense changes from the collectivity to the individual.12
This paradigm has proved to be inadequate. First, anthropological evidence
suggest that "when the law of simpler local communities is compared with the
law of the more complex state systems, [of] which they bec[o]me a part, the
direction of legal change is from emphasis on restitutive to a greater reliance on
repressive criminal law.' 3 Further evidence is provided by a cross-cultural
10 See S. Spitzer, op. cit., n. 7.
11 E. Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (Glencoe: Free Press, 1949)
12 E. Durkheim, "Two Laws of Penal Evolution," Economy and Society (August
1 9 7 3 ) p. 285.
13 Fred DuBow, "Nation-Building and the Imposition of Criminal Law," discussion
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study1 4 of fifty one societies ranging from non-industrialized to highly
industrialized, where it was shown that restitutive sanctions-damages and
mediation-which Durkheim'5 believed to be associated with an increasing
division of labor, are found in many societies that lack even rudimentary
specialization. On the other hand, in capitalist societies no significant trend has
been shown toward reliance on restitution as a replacement for repressive law.
Moreover, the trend has been toward an increasing use of penal laws to regulate
all kind of disputes, including matters of personal morality (e.g., homosexual
relationships, abortion, etc.).
1 6
Second, Durkheim's definition of repressive law as that which "in any
degree invokes against its author the characteristic reaction which we term
punishment"' 7 is a limited one. This definition does not encompass the wide
range of forms in which repression can occur. Repression is more than either the
physical punishment or the mere deprivation of liberty which Durkheim saw.
Indeed, it is also psychological deprivation of the ability to act independently,
regimentation and compartmentalization of certain areas of human activity,
and both physical and symbolic containment of certain population groups
within society.
Although Durkheim appropriately identified the state as a collective entity,
he failed to consider the notion of political structure. Therefore, we are unable
to include in his paradigm the historical fact that the focus of the offense has
moved through the evolution of society from the collectivity to the individual
and once more to the state.
Finally, Durkheim's notion of beliefs could be reformulated in terms of
Weber's concept of rational legal authority.' 8 That is, the state, by saying it is
acting on behalf of the people, gives a rational authority to the control which it
is exercising. Therefore, beliefs come to be the functional instrument of the state
to legitimate the existing legal and social order. However, the reality is that such
a rational legal order sometimes becomes very irrational.' 9
draft of a paper delivered at the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting
(Montreal, August 1974) p &
14 R. D. Schwartz and J. C. Miller, "Legal Evolution and Societal Complexity," 70
American Journal of Sociology 166 (1964).
15 E. Durkheim, op. ciL, n..11.
16 For further development of this argument see William J. Chambliss,"Functional
and Conflict Theories of Crime," 17 MSS Modular Publications 1 (1974).
17 E. Durkheim, op. cit., n. 11, p. 70.
18 Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills,
eds. (New York: Oxford U., 1946).
19 Solid supporters of this premise are: David Gordon, "Class and the Economics of
Crime," 3 The Review of Radical Political Economics, no. 3 (Summer 1971); Richard
Quinney, Critique of Legal Order: Crime Control in Capitalist Society (Boston: Little
Brown, (1973).
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The materialistic conception of history provides us with a better tool
to deal with the evolution of control. According to this perspective, the etiology,
evolution, and nature of control are directly related both to the economic order
and to the relations between rulees and rulers.2 0 This dialectical model suggests
that the contradictions in a given social order-which in the capitalist society are
found in the modes and relations of production-will express themselves in a
particular form of control. This perspective indeed serves as the foundation of
our paradigm.
The following table2 1 is an attempt to trace the historical evolution of
control. Note that the historical period is considered as a function of the
economic, ideological, and political order within society. The control system for
a particular period is understood in terms of the nature of society, the character
and etiology of control, and the definitions of deviance. The inclusion in the
table of two historical periods of control in Europe is designed to provide
additional evidence on our previous argument about the inadequacy of the
functional perspective. Yet, our paradigm will emanate from the scheme
concerning the evolution and etiology of social control in America.
As the following table shows, the evolution of control in America has been
in a curvilinear form. That is, the nature of control has moved from restitutive to
repressive to repressive-restitution as America has acquired a totalitarian
character. This model is dialectical in nature. Its internal dynamics thus involve a
thesis which is historically placed at the colonial period, an antithesis that is
found during the early capitalism, and a synthesis occurring in the present total
society.
Similarly, the control mechanisms have shifted from primary socializing
institutions (family, community) in the colonial period, to formal total control
institutions (egal and therapeutic) during the early capitalism, and to both total
and social control institutions in the present. However, social institutions during
the advanced total capitalism have a different character than those of the
colonial period. During the latter the emphasis was on primary socializing
agencies, the former puts more emphasis on the secondary ones (school, media,
sports, work). Besides, the present social institutions rely basically on symbolic
controls which respond to the state ideology. Moreover, the phenomenon has
been a take-over by the state of most of the functions of the primary socializing
agencies.
20 See Georg Rusche and Otto Kirchheirncr, Punishment and Social Structure (New
York: Russel & Russel, 1939).
21 Sources: Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insalnity in the
Age of Reason (New York: Vintage, 1973); Anthony Platt, The Child Savers: The Invention
of Delinquency (Chicago: U of Chicago, 1969); David J. Rothman, The Discovery of the
Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the New Republic (Boston: Little Brown, 1971),
Rusche and Kirchheimer, ibid; and Erik Olin Wright, The Politics of Punishment (New
York: Harpcr-Torchbooks, 1975).
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The same curvilinear trend is shown in the shift from integrated (colonial
period) to selected segregated handling (capitalist state) to the more recent
de-carceration movement, attempts of partial integration within the community
(e.g., half-way houses, ambulatory treatment units, day care centers), and
general preventive handling of prospective deviants. Also a tendency has been
seen toward a return to certain forms of private handling, e.g., franchised old age
centers.
Worth noting is the fact that, due to the dialectial character of this
model, control during the modern totalitarian capitalism assumes a character
which retains, in a renovated form, features present in both the colonial period
and the period of early capitalism.
In terms of the focus of the offense the movement has been from the
community in the colonial period, to the individual in the early capitalism, and
to the state in the present society. Due to this dialectical dynamics, the state is
not neutral anymore but transcends the individual and becomes the victim of
almost any form of deviance.
Finally, definitions of deviance in America are characterized throughout
their historical evolution by notable expansion. From the criminal offender of
the colonial period, the term has broadened-up to include criminals, insanes,
mental retardates, juveniles, old ages, homosexuals, and other groups of people
who are considered to be a threat to the system. Such an expansion well explains
the increasing trend in the use of informal controls by the state and its later
reliance on pro-active repression.
The paradigm that we attempted to develop can be finally summarized as:
HISTORICAL PERIOD
Evolution of: Colonial Early Capitalism Total Capitalism
(1600-1776) (1776-1920) (1920-
Punishment restitutive repressive repressive;
repressive-
restitution
Control partial total partial (primary
Institution (primary) and secondary);
total
Form of coercive; coercive symbolic;
Control symbolic coercive
Form of integrated segregated segregated;
Handling partially inte-
Deviants grated
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Character of Control
Our incursion into the character of control will be done through exploring
the nature of both social and total institutions. As established earlier, our
paradigm relies on the fact that control institutions are a reflection as well as a
product of the political, economic, and social order. Therefore, the characteristic
features, the selective processes for identifying their members, and the internal
and external policies of control institutions are similar to those of the total
society.
In this symbiotic relationship between control institutions and society
various levels of control shall be distinguished. Concepts such as human nature,
self-concept, levels of rationality, reward-punishment, and power, shall serve as
bases for cross-comparisons.
Total institutions (e.g., prisons, reformatories, mental and old age asylums,
etc.) are characterized by their closedness in encompassing all the activities of
their members. Although partial institutions (e.g., school, family, sports, media,
etc.) are not totally closed, they are not very far from it. Due to the totalitarian
nature of the American society, partial institutions operate as back-up
mechanisms of social control which reinforce and complement the total control
institutions.
The very nature of total institutions produces a destruction of one's self
identify, destruction of commitments with the rest of the world,2 2 and loss of
memory. 2 3 In a reciprocal way, people in a closed society lose their ability to
think critically. 2 4 It becomes impossible to define alternate directions which can
be accepted as normal since any alternative comes to be considered as being
deviant or co-opted as alternative expressions of normality. The definitions of
what is considered normal are supplied by the social control institutions which
are directed to impose an "appropriate" model of "normal self". Their emphasis
is directed toward the cognitive level of people within society and thus shape
their conception of reality. The consequence is a reduction of the options for
self development either because the state repressively constrains 25 or transforms
them,2 6 or because the culture destroys them.
2 7
Total therapeutic and penal institutions are similarly intended to create a
particular kind of self. In these the inmate's self is dismantled, damaged and
2 2 See E. 0. Wright, op cit., n. 21.
23 See J. Henry, op. cit., n. 9.
24 H. Marcuse, op. cit., n. 8.
25 Karl Marx, Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, T. B.
Bottomore and M. Rubel, eds. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964).
26 H. Marcuse, op. cit., n. 8.
27 J. Henry, op. cit, n:.9.
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contaminated. As part of this process the person faces a loss of identity (e.g.,
identified by a number; not being called by his name), property dispossession
personal defacement, physical and psychological indignities (e.g., physical
aggression by the guards and personnel; being exposed naked within the mental
institutions), denial of heterosexual activities, loss of sense of personal safety,
loss of self determination, and a destruction of memory orientation (particularly
in mental and old age asylums). These institutions not only lead to the
destruction of the prior self but also to the development of a "new self". 28 Yet
this process is simply a reflection of what is happening outside. The following
table provides a more succinct illustration.
Total Institution Total Society
The deviant self is molded The normal self is maintained as
through: "normal" through:
loss of identity atomization
loss of self-determination alienation
loss of life control regimentation, automation
loss of personal safety intimidation, terror
physical contamination pollution
interpersonal contamination pervasive influence of media
Within total institutions arise subcultures2 9 which reflect external social
and cultural differences. The inmate subculture emerges as a means to enhance
their chances of survival within the total closed system. 30 It may also be seen as a
response by the inmates to the limited opportunities offered by this environ-
ment.3 1 Yet, the inmate subculture has a counterpart in the guard subculture
which emerges to help the guards in coping with the necessity to use power
which is not based on real authority. Both inmate and guard subcultures come to
exist in a dialectical nature. The product of this process is a dynamic relationship
28 This proccss is analyzed in E. Goffman, op. cit., n. 5, also in Stigma: Notes on the
Management of Spoiled Identity (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963). For different
interpretations of this process see: Dorothea Braginsky and Benjamin Braginsky, Hansels
and Gretels: Studies of Children in Institutions for the Mentally Retarded (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1971) (people are labelled as deviant but they are capable to avoid
the dehumanizing effects and to influence on the development of their selves); and Gresham
Sykes, The Society of Captives: A Stud)' of a Maximum Security Prison in New Jersey
(Princeton: U. of Princeton Press, 1958) (although their selves are not destroyed people are
shaped into different roles).
29 A subculture is a set of beliefs, values, practices, "laws", relationships, etc., which
are distinguished from the dominant established culture. It emerges from the latter and may
either be at variance or opposed to it.
30 See E. 0. Wright, op. cit., n. 21.
31 G. Sykes, op. cit., n. 28.
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between these two groups, where one relinquishes power for limited authority
and the other dignity for survival.
Similarly, institutions for mentally retarded manifest a dialectical subcul-
tural relationship between the inmates and the institutional personnel. Braginsky
and Braginsky 3 2 conceptualized the behavior of the retardates as an instrumen-
tal rationality where they "begin to act retarded" as a way to cope with their
regimentalized environment and "gain the favor of the attendants and
matrons." 3 3 The latter, on the other hand, are not aware that the retardates are
actually manipulating them. Consequently, the result of this process is the
labelling and stigmatization of the retardates and the relinquishment of power
by the personnel through manipulations by part of the former.
So far we have dealt with the exercise of control for shaping behavior or
molding people's self. Yet, another level of control is that of regulating human
conduct. There is no doubt that mental asylums, prisons, and reformatories
attempt to restrain people from committing certain acts which are considered
harmful either to society or to themselves. However, when the case is that of
partial institutions their function in controlling and regulating behavior is more
subtle. The partial institutions operate in the anticipation of deviance, while
total institutions become functional after the occurrence of deviance.
The reward-punishment mechanism is the principal tool for achieving
regulatory control within total institutions. In prisons it is excercised through
disciplinary proceedings, the operation of probation, and the concession of
privileges. Privileges and punishment are also common to mental asylums and
senile institutions.
In order to channel hostilities and hold these institutions together in the
Durkheiman 34 sense, reward structures are occasionally employed to provide
what Goffman called "role release activities."' 3 5 Some of these activities are
parties, open houses, theatrical performances, and sport events. Yet, these role
release activities are also a symbolic way to both impose the control ideology of
the system and to project to the outside world an image of normality within the
institutions.
A similar reward-punishment structure exists in society at large. The welfare
system is a prime example where services and benefits are made conditional on
acceptable social behavior. They are also competitive, while control is exercised
through containing and pacifying the people by maintaining them as recipients
of welfare at a minimum economic level. 3 6
32 op. cit., n. 28.
331d., p. 173.
34 E. Durkheim, Rules of Sociological Method (Glencoe: Free Press, 1950).
35 Goffman, op. cit., n.. 5, p. 94.
36 This premise is developed and substantiated by Frances Fox Piven and Richard A.
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Among partial institutions, schools are a clear illustration of both the
regulatory and shaping features of control. On the one hand, schools teach
values, create patterns of behavior, and provide knowledge and skills; on the
other, they serve as a holding facility for keeping people out of the labor
market.3 7 Their power in terms of shaping conduct is enormous, since it is
directed toward breaking down people's allegiance to institutions and systems
other than those of the state (e.g., family, religion).
The institution of colonization is also an interesting one which sheds light
on our analysis of control. In the development of the concept of self exists a
dialectical relationship between the colonized and the colonizer. 38 As a
consequence of this relationship the colonized starts defining himself through
the categories of the colonizer. Therefore, his self goes throughout a transforma-
tion process in which some of his idiosyncratic features are either destroyed or
transformed into "colonized" ones. Similarly, the colonizer, in order to be
accepted by the colonized and to remove from himself the stigma of being and
of feeling being the oppressor, relinquishes some of his power into the hands of
the colonized (e.g., through internal agencies such as the police).
Thus, within this dialectical relationship there exist internal dynamic forces
which are specific to each group. That is, on one level, there is a development of
both the colonized and the colonizer's self as a function of the power relation-
ships between oppressor and his subordinates. On another level there are groups
and agencies neutralizing, reinforcing, and liberating tensions within these groups.
This dynamic of internal and external domination is similar to the one existing
between total society and control institutions on the external level, and between
rulers and rulees within institutions in the internal level. The result is, therefore,
transformations in both the concept of self and the means of power of each of
the groups.
Internal colonialism, which this writer identifies with the discriminatory and
segregative treatment that has been employed against blacks in America, could
very well be understood in terms of the above described dialectical relationship.
Yet it should be distinguished from the distinct geo-political element present in
external colonialism.
Other patterns of segregated control are found in reservations and
concentration camps. These institutions encompass culturally defined groups and
control is exercised for containment and regulation, with no direct intent in
shaping behavior. In this sense, these institutions have a similarity with those for
Cloward, Regulating the Poor (New York: Vintage, 1971).
37 See Ivan Illich, Deschooling Society (New York: Harper and Row, 1972) and Joel
H. Spring, Education and the Rise of the Corporate State (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972).
38 Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965).
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mental retardates and old people, where it is believed that nothing can be done
to either re-socialize or make them useful to society.
After exploring the nature of control institutions, it can be concluded that
there is not doubt about the totalitarian character of the present American
society. It has evolved into an irrational society where people can no longer use
their substantive rationality to choose among positive and negative alternatives,
but instead are symbolically controlled to act instrumentally for socially
administered and defined ends.
Nature of Deviance
Criminal deviance in America is a rational response to the structure of the
institutions on which the society is based. The most important examples of this
rational response to the competitiveness and inequality of life are the ghetto
crimes, organized crime, and corporate crimes. 3 9 However, non criminal
deviance (i.e., social junk) is the irrational product of the totalitarian capitalist
society.
Establishing linkages between the social structure, control systems, and
deviant behavior is a difficult task. Durkheim set the link in the beliefs
system, 4 0 but in so doing he missed the contribution of the political structure.
The anomie theorists, e.g., Merton, 41 Cloward and Ohlin, 4 2 talked about a
limited opportunity structure; however, they could not relate it to the particular
individual conduct. Marx 4 3 and Bonger, 44 among the conflict theorists,
established the nexus in the social structure which was seen as the cause of
deviance. However, they did not include in their analysis the motivational
behavior of the "insane" and "mentally retarded."
Our paradigm atttempts to enhance the conflict perspective. As we conceive
it, criminal deviance is produced by the structural conditions of society, which
both create the material conditions for its occurrence and operate upon certain
psychological conditions in the individual that predispose him toward deviance.
The indigents and the aged should be seen as the product of this irrational
society which makes them obsolete. On the other hand, the mental retardates
and the insanes, in most cases, are definitional categories created by the social
39 D. Gordon, op. cit., n.. 19.
40 E. Durkhcim, op. cit., nn. 11, 35.
41 Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoc: Free Prcss, 1957).
42 Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin, Delinquency and Opportunity: A Theory on
Delinquent Gangs (New York: Free Press, 1960).
43 Marx, op. cit., n.. 25.
44 Wiliam Bonger, Criminality and Economic Conditions (New York: Agathon Press,
1967).
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and political structure to enhance its realm of control as well as to deal with
persons who are not productive within a society which is organized on economic
terms.
Conclusion
The present paradigm suggests only one conclusion-the development of a
society where deviance will be substantially reduced and its causes will be
traceable both to the individual and to the society. This society should be an
open one in which people relate to themselves and to the world productively.
Critical thinking should be emphasized and the person should be able to create
his own social being and to orient his social values toward the utility of the
community. Social values should be placed in a primary position when making
decisions about economic matters. Production processes should be oriented
toward the social well-being of the collectivity rather than toward materialistic
productivity.
The basis of order should be some sort of decentralized political
organization. Yet it should not be instituted to benefit a particular group, but
rather 'to benefit the collectivity. It should also lie on democratic foundations.
Control would be an instrument of social justice exercised primarily at the
community level. It would emanate from the community and would treat the
deviant as an integral part of the society by incorporating him to function as
part of it. Therefore, the responsibility for control should rely on the
community.
LA PELIGROSIDAD Y EL DERECHO PENAL*
Olga Elena Resumil de Sanfilippo**
El concep to de peligrosidad
La peligrosidad, en general, se puede definir como la actitud de un ser o de
una cosa, de una acci6n o de un hecho a producir, ante los ojos de quien juzga,
un evento dafiino. La primera noci6n de peligrosidad fue formulada bajo el
nombre de ternibilidad por Rafael Gar6falo durante la segunda mitad del
pasado siglo. Desde su punto de vista se trataba de un nuevo criterio positivista
de penalidad. Con este t6rmino quiso sefialar la perversidad activa y permanente
de un individuo y la cantidad de dafio posible que se puede temer en 61.
Adolphe Prins formul6 indirectamente la noci6n de peligrosidad en su
discurso de apertura al primer congreso nacional belga en 1892 al decir que "la
verdadera tarea del juez es aqu6lla de apreciar el cargcter mis o menos antisocial
del culpable y el grado de intensidad del motivo antisocial que lo empuj6 a
cometer la acci6n delictiva."'
En sus albores el concepto de peligrosidad no se propuso como una teoria
general capaz de reemplazar las concepciones clfisicas de imputabilidad y
responsabilidad moral, sino 6inicamente como una doctrina aplicable a una cierta
categoria de delincuentes: el psic6pata y el delincuente habitual. A fines del siglo
diecinueve se manifest6 como un fen6meno dado la insuficiencia de la pena a los
fines de reeducacibn o rehabilitaci6n. La reincidencia presentaba cifras notables
*Extracto del capitulo del mismo nombre en El juicio de peligrosidad, tesis de
especializaci6n, Roma, 1976.
**B.A., J.D., Univ. de Puerto Rico; Diploma di Specializzazione in Diritto Penale e
Criminologia (2 ahios), Universiti degli Studi di Roma; Catedr~tica Auxiliar, Facultad de
Derecho de la Universidad de Puerto Rico.
1 Citado por Jim6nez de Asiia en L 'etat dangereux ou la pericolosit et le droit
pdnal, en Revue Internationale de Criminologie et Police Tecnique, n. 3, 1954, pug. 67.
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que fueron concretadas por Prins 2 en 1899 como un 62% de la poblaci6n
carcelaria belga. En particular, a menudo se tomaba como pretexto un supuesto
vicio de mente, que de ser reconocido --como sucedia en la mayoria de las
ocasiones- tenia como consecuencia la exclusi6n de la responsabilidad,
teni6ndose como resultado la impunidad en una gran cantidad de delitos graves.
El vagabundaje y la miseria, resultado del movimiento urbanistico, fueron una
causa de la delincuencia.
Frente a este fen6meno social, la escuela positiva declaraba la guerra a los
principios fundamentales de la legislaci6n penal en la convicci6n de que estaban
superados. Ferri consider6 el delito como un sintoma de personalidad anormal.
Basindose en la teoria de la responsabilidad social concluyb que el estado tenia
el derecho y la obligaci6n de reprimir al delincuente normal o anormal,
subordinando la represi6n en la forma y medida que el hecho delictivo fuera
cometido y de acuerdo con la potencia ofensiva del autor, o sea, su peligrosidad.
La escuela clisica no ignor6 la necesidad de internar en un manicomio al
loco peligroso, simplemente afirmaba que la internaci6n constituia una medida
extra-penal dirigida (nicamente a la prevencibn de la criminalidad y de
competencia exclusiva de los 6rganos administrativos. Puede concluirse entonces
que la diferencia entre escuela clisica y escuela positiva se funda en la naturaleza
juridica de la medida y no en la existencia de un peligro en la persona y en el
tomar medidas tendientes a la prevenci6n del delito y a su control. Podemos,
pues, concluir que las medidas existian como una realidad relevante para el
derecho cuando fue declarado el concepto de peligrosidad.
Varias teorias sobre peligrosidad
Seghn Ferri la peligrosidad consistia en una potencialidad sobresaliente que
posefa el individuo hacia la comisi6n de acciones punibles y que se resolvfa en
una mayor probabilidad (mayor respecto al hombre medio) de cometer un
delito. Esta apreciaci6n necesitaba, sin embargo, para su formulaci6n una
subjetivacibn que se refiriese a una entidad propia del individuo, o sea, encontrar
en l una cualidad que fuese la causa del peligro. Consciente de ello, Grispigni
3
defini6 la peligrosidad como la capacidad de una persona de convertirse en un
probable autor de un delito. Consider6 aplicable este concepto a tantos casos en
los cuales se habia cometido un delito y a aquellos donde existia peligrosidad sin
delito ya que, desde su punto de vista, las dos situaciones eran id6nticas y
cambiaban exclusivamente en lo que respecta a los elementos constitutivos de la
peligrosidad y a las medidas que debian adoptarse. Se refiere, sin embargo, a una
2 Prins, La defensa social, Madrid, 1912, pig. 87.
3 "La pericolositi criminale e il valore sintomatico del rcato" en Scuola Positiva, 1920,
pig. 100.
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categoria especial de individuos: los anormales psiquicos. Por ello consider6 que
desde el punto de vista psiquico la peligrosidad es una forma de ser del sujeto,
una cualidad que definib como la condici6n psiquica de una persona, probable
causa de un delito.
Jim6nez de Asfia 4 crey6 dificil la tarea de dar una definici6n exacta del
concepto de peligrosidad. No defendi6 ninguna formula concreta y concibi6
6inicamente una f6rmula amplia que incluyese todos los individuos que tuvieran
necesidad de un tratamiento tutelar como consecuencia de su actividad.
Florian 5 en t~rminos generales concuerda con la definici6n de Grispigni y
considera la peligrosidad como atributo subjetivo propio del autor constituido
por una tendencia a delinquir. Rechaz6, sin embargo, el concepto que
consideraba peligrosos (inicamente a los individuos psiquicamente anormales ya
que ni todos los peligrosos son psiquicamente anormales ni todos los anormales
psiquicos son peligrosos o se muestran antisociales. Afirma que la peligrosidad se
encuentra 6inicamente en la personalidad del autor sin tener en cuenta el hecho
delictivo. La peligrosidad es para 61, por tanto. la suma del hecho delictivo y la
personalidad del autor.
En contraposici6n a estas teorias encontramos los objetivistas que yen la
peligrosidad como un estado objetivo descrito por la norma y no como una
tendencia a probabilidad de dafio existente en una persona, y por tanto, un
delito en si misma.
6
El verdadero sistematizador de esta tendencia fue Sabatini quien distingui6
entre peligrosidad e inmanencia criminal.7 Esta 6ltima es presupuesto obligado
de la peligrosidad: es el complejo de las condiciones biopsicopatol6gicas de las
cuales surge la actividad criminal de los sujetos anormales. Por su naturaleza es
interna y determinada por los elementos individuales de carficter psiquico que
tienden hacia la permanencia. La peligrosidad criminal para Sabatini no es
atributo del delincuente sino uno especial y verdadero del delito, la peligrosidad
criminal, propia (inicamente de una cierta categoria de delincuentes. En la base
del delito esti el complejo de conducta antisocial fruto de la inmanencia criminal
del autor. Entonces, ia peligrosidad es algo objetivo previsto por una f6rmula
legislativa, como lo son las formas de culpabilidad, los delitos dolosos y cul-
posos, por lo cual se puede hablar de dclitos peligrosos causados por un estado
de inmanencia criminal.
PetrocelliS define la peligrosidad como un complejo de condiciones
4 La pericolosiu (nuovo criterio per it trattamnento repressivo e preventivo). Torino,
1923, prig. 128.
5 Note sulla pericolositW criminale, en Scuola Positiva, 1927, p. 401.
6 Longhi, Repressione e prevenzione nel diritto penale attuale, Milano, 1911, p. 887.
7 La pericolositti criminale en Scuola Penale, 1927, IfI, p. 15.
8 La pericolosith criminale e la sua posizione giuridica, Padova, 1940, p. 47.
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objetivas y subjetivas bajo las cuales es probable que el individuo cometa un
hecho socialmente dafioso o peligroso. Esta definici6n niega especialmente el
caricter de cualidad, propiedad, capacidad o tendencia. Olesa Mufiido critica a
Petrocelli afirmando que tal concepcibn de peligrosidad eminentemente juridica
la desvincula del individuo haci6ndola depender de un complejo de condiciones
que hacen posible la conducta. 9 El considera la peligrosidad como "la situaci6n
en la persona adecuada a hacerle realizar con probabilidad acciones que
constituyen infracciones a la norma." 0
El diagn6stico de peligrosidad
La exposici6n hecha en la secci6n precedente ha demostrado que la doctrina
se divide en dos teorias en el tema de la definici6n de peligrosidad: la objetiva,
que pretende encontrarla en previsiones legislativas asi como se encuentran los
conceptos de dolo y culpa, y la subjetiva, la cual encuentra el status de
peligrosidad en el individuo.
Ante la necesidad de tener que tomar posici6n para establecer cu@l de las
dos principales corrientes es la mis adecuada al fen6meno que nos ocupa,
tenemos que rechazar la teoria objetiva. De hecho, si se acepta como
presupuesto que la peligrosidad es la condictio sine qua non para la aplicaci6n de
las medioas de seguridad, no se la puede considerar como un concepto objetivo
fijado por una norma.
iQu6 significa medida de seguridad? Significa una medida que si bien pre-
vista por el derecho positivo (por razones ligadas al principio de legalidad),
inicamente puede ser aplicada cuando el individuo se encuentre en situaciones
de hecho particulares; en una posicibn que, relevante para el derecho, sea
definida como un status, status de individuo peligroso. jC6mo ha de ser
determinado este status? Naturalmente, haciendo referencia a la norma juridica.
Este es el punto central de la cuesti6n; el error en el cual, desde nuestro punto de
vista, cae la teoria objetiva, error que trae su origen en el ver la peligrosidad
inicamente en la norma, o sea, creer que los elementos determinantes de la
peligrosidad constituyen la peligrosidad misma.
La previsi6n legislativa abstracta constituye un modelo gen6rico ya que se
funda en cilculos de probabilidad que son a su vez abstractos y, por tanto, sin un
diagn6stico concreto de una futura repetici6n del actuar delictivo.
Adem6s, una concepci6n de peligrosidad que se concreta a estos puntos no
puede satisfacer puesto que:
9 Las inedidas de seguridad, Barcelona, 195 1, p. 73.
10 Id., pig. 75.
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a) descuida el hacer una investigacibn acerca del material humano que
podria o no dar los indicios de peligrosidad; y
b) se acontenta, al explicar un fen6meno que es exquisitamente humano,
de connotaciones juridicas, las cuales no pueden ser otra cosa que
medio y no fin en el momento en que se utilizan.
En adici6n, aun cuando se asemeje la posici6n de la peligrosidad al dolo o a
la culpa, no se adelanta en la definicibn del concepto ya que tanto la culpa como
el dolo, en cuanto a la intensidad o grado se determinarin despu6s del examen
concreto del autor, salvo los casos de responsabilidad objetiva. Si luego esta
teoria desea ir mis alli tratando de establecer una ecuaci6n entre peligrosidad y
delito (en el sentido que la peligrosidad deba verse como un titulo de delito),
apareceria todavia mis clara la desviaci6n del principio bisico que rige el
ordenamiento juridico-penal ya que la peligrosidad puede existir sin los
elementos necesarios en cada figura de delito.
Por todo lo anteriormente expuesto no podemos aceptar la teoria objetiva
de peligrosidad.
Para poder presentar correctamente el problema hemos considerado Citil
partir de la concepci6n de Olesa Mufiido' 1 modificindola para no dar lugar a la
posibilidad de aplicacibn de medidas de seguridad pre-delictuales.
La peligrosidad es, segfin nuestro punto de vista, una cualidad humana que
se verifica en una situacibn especial bajo condiciones especiales que hacen
probable la reincidencia en un autor de accibn punible. Afirmamos lo anterior ya
que la experiencia demuestra que en cierto sentido en cada hombre hay una
posibilidad de causar cualquier tipo de dafio; por lo tanto, si definimos la
peligrosidad en manera gen6rica de posibilidades, todos formariamos parte de la
categoria de individuos peligrosos; y como tales ser amos todos pasibles de
medidas de seguridad: en vez de vivir en una sociedad libre y democritica, nos
convertiriamos en sfibditos de un estado terap6utico constituido a su vez por
hombres peligrosos, convirti6ndose tambi6n el estado en sujeto de medidas de
seguridad. Esta extensibn al absurdo nos sirve para darnos cuenta que dentro del
contexto del derecho penal no podemos incluir a todos los peligrosos latentes,
peligrosos en potencia, puesto que solamente la probabilidad o la casi certeza de
la reincidencia por parte de un delincuente particular constituye el verdadero
estado de peligro.
Se ha discutido si la peligrosidad subsiste 6nicamente en quien haya
cometido acciones punibles o si el hecho delictivo es innecesario. Olesa, como
otros autores, retienen exacta esta iltima tesis ya que para ellos el (Inico
elemento caracteristico de la peligrosidad es la posible verificaci6n de un evento
11 Supra, nota 9.
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delictivo, constituyendo el delito cometido un indicio mis sobre el cual basarse
al hacer un juicio de peligrosidad. Pero para que subsista la peligrosidad (ya sea
gen6rica o especifica seg(in la capacidad de cometer un hecho previsto por la ley
como delito 1 2 se refiera a cualquier delito en una determinada categoria) es
necesario que la lamada capacidad a cometer el delito sea tal que pueda suscitar
alarma en la sociedad, lo que sucede cuando las posibilidades positivas de
verificaci6n del evento son num6ricamente superiores a las posibilidades
negativas, como es el caso del que ha cometido delito o alguna acci6n que no
constituy6 delito, como en el caso del inimputable peligroso.
Entonces, la hip6tesis de peligrosidad individuada con anterioridad a la
comisi6n del delito no encuentra lugar, desde nuestro punto de vista, en el
ordenamiento juridico penal; si acaso, pudieran disciplinarse como parte de las
medidas de policfa. 1 3 Aquf caen aquellos casos en los cuales la persona pueda
presentar un grado de peligrosidad, (existe en 61 la probabilidad) pero que
todavia no ha cometido acciones punibles. Entrarian tambi6n aquellos casos de
peligrosidad transitoria 14 para los cuales se justifica un largo tratamiento. Aqui
12 El concepto capacidad se usa cn sentido naturalistico. Ny no en cl sentido especifico
quc se le atribuye en el campo del derecho como capacidad juridica.
13 Como ha sido tratado y reglamentado por la legislaci6n italiana con disposiciones
relativas a personas peligrosas para la sociedad (articulos 153-156 del texto inico de leves de
seguridad piiblica y 272-284 del reglamcnto). "El articulo 153 obliga a los ldicos a
denunciar a la autoridad de policia (a los fines de la vigilancia que compete a dicha
autoridad) a las personas enfermas de mente o que prescnten una grave enfermedad
psiquica, las cuales demuestren o den sospechas de scr peligrosas a si o a los demnis ... por
lo cual se prev6 una internaci6n. .... Hasta que no surja el peligro para la incolumidad dcl
mismo enajenado o de extrafios, o haya escindalo pfblico, el cuidado y custodia se Ilevara a
cabo preferiblemente en casa de familiares del enajenado, a los fines de evitar. en cuanto
posible, restricciones a la libertad personal .... En el caso contrario sc prev
6 la internaci6n en
una instituci6n siguiendo un procedimiento especial .... [L]a obligaci6n de la denuncia
subsiste tambi6n para aquellas personas que resulten afectadas por intoxicaci6n cr6nica
producida por alcohol o estupefacientes ... tambi6n para cstos ... con las mismas
modalidades previstas ... previa sujeci6n a atenci6n y cura desintoxicante id6nca. Se precisa
que en tales casos, es muy rara la posibilidad de intemacibn do urgencia de parte de la
policia.... [Tambi6n se considera la mendicidad]bajo un ddplice perfil en relaci6n al peligro
social que puede derivar de ella y en relaci6n al deber de prestar ayuda a los necesitados. El
artfculo 154 prohibe la mendicidad ptiblica reproduciendo el precepto contenido en el
artfculo 670 del c6digo penal... [con] sanci6n mis grave prevista... cuando .-. cometido
simulando enfermedad... justificada por la mayor peligrosidad social de esta forma de
mendicidad que sofoca en los nifios cualquier sentimiento de dignidad, habitunindolos al ocio
y a la hipocresia, factores que pueden favorecer la formaci6n irregular del caricter de los
menores y el surgir de tendencias criminosas ... "
Extracto de Bonichi, E. Le leggi di Pztbblica Sicurezza, Roma, 1973.
14 Se distinguen fundamentalmente como formas dc peligrosidad, la permanente y la
transitoria. Se entiende por permanente aquella situaci6n en la persona (en palabras de
Olesa Muffido) de un individuo consistente en la perduraci6n de la probabilidad de cometer
delitos. No exige un carkcter de perpetuidad sino 6nicamente que sea de naturaleza tal quc
necesite de una actuaci6n externa al individuo que modifique la situaci6n. La peligrosidad,
sin embargo, puede desaparecer sin acci6n externa por curaci6n cspont/inca o por
autocorrcci6n del individuo, sin embargo permaneciendo una tendencia a subsistir derivada
no de una excitaci6n sino de un verdadero estado de la personalidad quc no desaparcceri
sino por medio de una acci6n externa que se actuari sobre los estimulos internos para
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el problema es distinto: la intervenci6n del estado no se tiene para determinar
una condici6n (el estado de peligrosidad) que sobre todo sirve para etiquetar y
cualificar negativamente al individuo, sino que se justifica en el amplio poder de
intervenci6n a los fines de prevencibn general (porque protege la sociedad) y
especial (porque ayuda a la persona a que no cometa delitos, sin lesionar los
derechos subjetivos de los ciudadanos que no han violado la norma, someti6ndo-
los a una disciplina prevista por la ley en cuanto se dirige a personas peligrosas a
la moralidad y seguridad plblicas).
El derecho penal deberi entrar en juego 6nicamente alli donde se haya
cometido una acci6n punible, culpable o no, segfin el juicio que se haga del
autor. El estudio de la prevenci6n indirecta es competencia del crimin6logo y no
del penalista prictico, como bien decia Jim6nez de Asfia refiri6ndose a los
estados de peligrosidad predilectual: "Se trata de individuos mis descontentos
que malvados, los cuales deben interesar al estado mis bien como mendigos,
vagabundos, prostitutas y enfermos de mente que como posibles criminales." 1 5
Estamos de acuerdo con la Dra. Silving cuando afirma que para que el
derecho penal entre en acci6n -cuando existe un diagn6stico de peligrosidad- la
probabilidad de dafio debe referirse a un dafio previsto por la norma penal,
teni6ndose en cuenta que no todos los dafios previstos por la ley requieren la
intervenci6n del estado cuando se trata de una mera posibilidad de peligro."' 6
Cualquier dafio justifica una sancibn despu6s que se haya efectuado pero no
cuando se verifica como una mera posibilidad de acci6n futura.
Los indicios de peligrosidad
Para que el estado de peligrosidad pueda ser diagnosticado y evaluado, es
necesario que el mismo se revele. Los indicios sobre los cuales se funda el juicio
de peligrosidad, no pueden ser predeterminados en manera absoluta y categ6rica
en cuanto 6stos variarin en concreto dependiendo de los individuos particulares.
Existen todavia indicios fundamentales que deben tenerse en cuenta al momento
de emitir un diagn6stico de peligrosidad. Uno de estos indicios es la modalidad
modificar las circunstancias consistentes o determinantes (v6ase Olesa Mufiido, op. cit., pdg.
87). La peligrosidad transitoria, por cl contrario, es externa a la personalidad y adolece de
continuidad en cl tiempo, o sea, producida por una excitaci6n a la cual la acci6n delictiva
subyace. Ejemplos de esta peligrosidad transitoria lo son la embriaguez, la intoxicaci6 n y el
estado mental transitorio. El individuo que se encuentra en estos estados es un perturbado
moment'inco, peligroso si, pero con una peligrosidad quc seri adjudicada diversamente al
momento do actuar las mcdidas que habrdn de ser aplicadas en cada caso. Asi la peligrosidad
transitoria no ameritaria una medida de naturaleza juridica como seria el caso de la
peligrosidad permancntc.
15 Traducido dc L'etat dangereux ou la pericolosit6 et le droit p~nal, loc. cit., pdg.
170.
16 Constituent elements of crime, Thomas publisher, pig. 170, 1967.
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de la accibn, el despliegue de conducta o comportaniento capaz de justificar una
alarma en quien hace el diagn6stico. Sin la manifestaci6n extrinseca del
individuo, todas las demas circunstancias, inherentes al individuo, podrin
determinar un juicio de peligrosidad eventual y no uno de peligrosidad concreta
y efectiva. Es necesario, sin embargo, discutir si la acci6n punible implica
siempre y necesariamente un estado de peligrosidad. Dirigiendo el problema
hacia la permanencia de la peligrosidad despu~s de la comisi6n de la acci6n, la
cual puede no persistir como en el caso aIe la peligrosidad transitoria, existente
tambi6n al momento de la perpetraci6n del hecho, no hay duda de que el
individuo revela su concreta capacidad a delinquir tal que se hace evidente la
peligrosidad. La importancia de la comisi6n de la acci6n punible para la
determinaci6n de la peligrosidad proviene del complejo de elementos subjetivos
(motivos determinantes como la intenci6n vista en el despliegue de conducta o
comportamiento) y objetivos (naturaleza y entidad del dafio) que la cualifican y
la caracterizan en concreto.
El indicio fluentisimo para el juicio de peligrosidad es la personalidad del
individuo, deducida ademris de por la modalidad de la acci6n, por la
constituci6n bio-psiquica y por las condiciones objetivas de vida. A este
prop6sito asumen tambi6n una importancia notable los precedentes judiciales, el
ambiente familiar y social, el grado de instruccibn del individuo, asi como los
demis requisitos que a los fines de la individualizaci6n de la pena habri de tomar
en consideraci6n el juez al determinar la sentencia segfin el articulo 60 del
c6digo penal de Puerto Rico.
1 7
El profesor argentino Osvaldo Loudet present6 en el Congreso de
Criminologia de Paris de 1950 un plan metodol6gico de investigaci6n sobre el
diagn6stico del estado peligroso. En su obra clasifica los indicios de peligrosidad
en: indicios sociales, legales y m6dico-psicol6gicos, considerando este filtimo
como el mis grave, el mis permanente y el menos sujeto a modificaci6n porque
se traduce en la personalidad del sujeto y en sus reacciones a un medio social
determinado. Por indicios m6dico-psicol6gicos del estado de peligro entiende
"las entidades psfquicas o las simples faltas de armonfa de la misma naturaleza"
(de las entidades psiquicas precedentes) "que en circunstancias determinadas o
17 "Fijaci6n de las penas
Dentro de los limites establecidos por la ley, las penas se fijarin de acuerdo a la mayor
o menor gravedad del hecho cometido y tomando en consideraci6n, entre otras, las
siguientes circunstancias:
(a) La naturaleza de la acci6n u omisi6n delictuosa.
(b) Los medios empleados.
(c) La importancia de los deberes transgredidos.
(d) La extensibn del dafio del peligro causado.
(e) La edad, educaci6n, historial social y reputaci6n del autor.
(f) La conducta relacionada con el delito antes, durante y despu6s de la comisi6n del
mismo.
(g) La calidad de los m6viles del hecho.
(h) La conducta de la victima relacionada con la transacci6n delictuosa."
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indeterminadas permiten pronosticar una reaccibn antisocial".' 8 Incluye entre
enajenados psiquicos los semi-enajenados y los sujetos de constituci6n psicopi-
tica, apoyando su tesis en numerosas estadisticas que demostraban que los
reincidentes (antisociales) presentan anomalias de conducta que se traducen en
reacciones antisociales pequefias o de poca gravedad. Esta tesis, sin embargo, esti
dirigida totalmente a individuos que presentan anomalias mentales y tenemos
que tener presente, como bien dice Hesnard, 1 9 que la dificultad se presenta no
en el diagnosticar el estado peligroso de un paranoico confirmado o de un
esquizofr6nico indiscutible sino en el diagn6stico de peligrosidad del delincuente
normal que no presenta sintomas de enfermedad mental. Criticamos, por tanto,
esta clasificaci6n enteraniente patol6gica hecha por Loudet ya que es necesario
tomar en consideraci6n al hacer el diagn6stico de peligrosidad que no se esti
haciendc un diagn6stico de enfermedad mental mis o menos grave ni de una
peligrosidad derivada de un diagn6stico psiquiitrico. Se trata tambi6n de hacer
un diagn6stico de peligrosidad derivado de una cualidad humana verificada bajo
condiciones especiales que Ilevan a la reincidencia y es necesario recordar que
esta cualidad o situaci6n especial no es 6nicamente de caricter patol6gico. Basta
pensar en los casos de habitualidad en el delito donde en el delincuente asi
tipificado no existe anomalia mental. El delincuente promedio, no psic6pata, no
revela su peligrosidad a trav6s del diagn6stico de un psiquiatra en condiciones
normales de pericia.
Luego de la descripci6n de los indicios de peligrosidad que llama
m6dico-psicol6gicos en individuos sometidos a pericia psiquiftrica especialmente,
Loudet describe los indicios sociales, proporcionados a los factores ambientales;
indicio social que aparece muy a menudo como dominante. Es innegable que el
desorden familiar es uno de tantos factores crimin6genos; en el mismo modo es
innegable la influencia del factor econ6mico como criminbgeno, por ejemplo, en
los delitos contra la propiedad; y mucho menos la influencia de la mala
educaci6n, de la sugestibn y de la imitaci6n (se llama la atencibn a las llamadas
asociaciones diferenciales 2o) en los medios caracterizados por el abandono, la
vagancia y las condiciones de vida anormales; sobre todo en las barriadas pobres
18 Loudct, Osvaldo, El diagnbstico del estado peligroso - metodologia (12 informe del
congreso internacional de Criminologia de Paris, 1950)."Las entidades psiquicas o las simples faltas de armonfa de la misma naturaleza, etc.
Esto significa que existen modelos psiquicos patol6gicos algunas veces presentes en
individuos y mis ali de ellos una falta de concordancia en la psiquis (reconducibles
dcsde el punto de vista psiquico a los modelos patol6gicos en cuesti 6 n) que, alli
donde el sujeto se enfrente o no a una situaci6n precisa) permiten diagnosticar en 61
una reacci6n antisocial".
Sobre cl mismo tema vase Sernerari e Citterio, "Reazioni abnorme al avvenimento",
cap. 13 en Medicina Criminologica e Psichiatria Forense, Milano, Valladi, 1975, Pgs.
295-315.
19 Psicologia del crimen, Parte II, Barcelona, Zeus, 1963, p~ig. 230.
20 Manheim, Trattato di Criminologia Comparata, Vol. 11, Torino, 1975 pig. 591 et.
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donde se presenta mayor la delincuencia juvenil y, por t.ltimo, donde la
formaci6n imitativa conduce a una vida que se protracta en un esquema de
conducta criminal. De ahi la justa subdivisi6n que hace la Dra. Silving de la
reincidencia condicionada sociol6gicamente, donde clasifica al reincidente no
psic6pata cuya situaci6n especial revela una cualidad humana especial resultante
de las condiciones ambientales en la cual transcurre su infancia que le hicieron
formar un ideal delincuencial (ego ideal). 2 1 Es necesario, por lo tanto, tomar en
consideraci6n los indicios sociales al hacer el diagnbstico de peligrosidad ya que
dotado de estas experiencias particulares podrd el observador vislumbrar en la
personalidad particular del individuo colocado en situaci6n especial, los primeros
sintomas de reincidencia.
En altima instancia coloca Loudet los Ilamados indicios legales, los cuales se
refieren a los antecedentes de policia y a los antecedentes judiciales del
delincuente. Critica a este respecto los 6rdenes que de valores revela Ferrari en
sus tres criterios y propone colocar el criterio personalidad del delincuente con
prioridad a la gravedad del delito y a los motivos que determinaron la acci6n
punible. El delito para Loudet no constituye el elemento principal de
individuacibn de la peligrosidad ya que existe una multitud de pequefios delitos
cometidos por individuos peligrosos (psic6patas, delincuentes habituales por
tendencia cong6nita) y viceversa delitos muy graves cometidos por sujetos no
peligrosos como en el caso de delincuentes pasionales. En definitiva, los indicios
legales, en la mayoria de los casos no hacen otra cosa que contribuir como
elementos complementarios a los m6dico-psicolbgicos y sociales y son a menudo
subordinados a 6stos. Es necesario estar atentos a los indicios legales que pueden
contradecir los demis indicios; como por ejemplo, una persona que ha sido
condenada por delitos de la misma naturaleza mis de dos veces podria sugerir un
delincuente habitual mientras que los indicios m6dico-psicol6gicos y sociales
revelarian un delincuente ocasional susceptible de resocializaci6n mediante el
tratamiento de la pena. El legislador puertorriquefio cae en un error cuando
presume la peligrosidad en todas las categorias de delincuentes peligrosos
(haciendo excepcibn del caso del absuelto por incapacidad mental) basindose
finicamerite en la cantidad de delitos cometidos que sean de la misma
naturaleza. 2
2
Claro esti, que estos indicios legales no pueden ser ignorados ya que son
21 Repeated Offender, categoria que subdivide en delincuente habitual y reincidente.
Incluye en el primer grupo los delincuentes anorniales o mentalmente incapaces y en el
ultimo los considerados normales incluyendo dentro de esta categorfa la Sociologicalli,
Conditioned Repeated Criminality, grupo compuesto por delincuentes normales cuyas cir-
cunstancias de vida los han hecho aceptar esquemas de conducta criminal, particularmente
debida al crecimiento en ambientes criminogen6ticos.
22 Articulos 72, 73 y 74, C6digo Penal de Puerto Rico. Son los casos dcl delincuente
sexual peligroso, el delincuente compulsivo y el delincucnte habitual.
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necesarios para la determinaci6n de la peligrosidad de retorno 2 3 una vez
declarada la reincidencia.
En tema de indicios psicol6gicos, aun cuando 6stos sean los indicios mis
aproximativos para la determinaci6n de peligrosidad, es necesario evitar el caer
en el "patologismo" recordando que tambi6n los individuos normales cometen
acciohes punibles como lo reconoci6 el mismo Grispigni.
2 4
Las acciones punibles calificadas o no de delito, ademds del posible sintoma
de enfermedad mental, son el sintoma juridico de peligrosidad. Naturalmente, el
delito es una revelacibn parcial psiquica del individuo (en palabras de Grispigni)
en la medida que demuestra la existencia en el autor de una capacidad de
cometer hechos previstos como delito por la ley. Aqu6l que ha cometido
acciones punibles es el delincuente probable del futuro.
De la exposici6n precedente se hace forzoso concluir que el juicio de
peligrosidad (diagn6stico de peligrosidad individual y pronostico de una
conducta futura probable) seri mis exacto segfin el quantum de los elementos
indiciarios utilizados. Es necesario siempre recordar que se trata de un juicio mis
que de certeza de probabilidad y que seri necesario basarlo sobre todo en la
personalidad del autor desde los distintos ingulos de 6sta, los aspectos
morfol6gico-fisiol6gicos, conativos y afectivos del individuo segon el rol que
ocupa en su ambiente social, reconstruyendo la vida precedente al acto cometido
y conociendo las motivaciones que concluyeron en la acci6n punible; sin olvidar,
a] aplicar los criterios objetivos y subjetivos, el criterio importante de la
personalidad moral del sujeto que segsn los psic6logos falta en el examen de la
personalidad.
2 5
El brgano liamado a hacer el diagnbstico de peligrosidad
Como se ha dicho hasta ahora, la verdadera peligrosidad es aquella que
puede derivarse del hecho que el individuo haya cometido una acci6n punible.
La norma juridica da un camino al 6rgano adjudicador sobre los casos en los
cuales la peligrosidad deberi ser determinada: los Ilamados indicios legales, que
ciertamente dependerin de la reglamentaci6n que haya seleccionado el legislador
para regir en esta materia seghn la politica legislativa. En general, los tipos
delincuenciales sujetos a medidas especiales se dividen en dos grandes categorias:
23 Trmino acufiado por Hesnard, op. cit., prig. 243.
24-, .. los autorcs de delito no se distinguen morfol6gicamente ni psicol6gicamente de
las deris personas quc tienen a su alrededor, por cl contrario, ocurre reconocer que la
mayoria de los dclincucntes son normales". Derecho Penal Italiano.
25 "In particular, los cxarmcnes psicol6gicos encaminados a descubrir la pcligrosidad
adoleccen de una falta . . . en materia de psicologia criminal: la falta de exploraci6n psiquica
profunda dcl comportaniento 6ico: del estado de concepcion moral, personal y social".
liesnard, op. cit., pig. 234.
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los inimputables y los reincidentes, incluyendo en esta 6ltima categoria una
cantidad heterog6nea de tipos delincuenciales tales como el delincuente habitual,
el toxic6mano o alcoh6lico habitual, el delincuente profesional o por tendencia,
el delincuente sexual peligroso, el compulsivo, etc. Este camino es, sin embargo,
solo un aspecto del cual tomar consideracibn al emitir el juicio de peligrosidad,
ya que, como dice Vassalli al hablar de la peligrosidad presunta, 2 6 la rigida
aplicaci6n de las normas juridicas prescindiendo de la evaluaci6n individual del
sujeto falsea el diagn6stico y, en consecuencia, el pron6stico sobre el cual se
apoya el juicio de peligrosidad y la prevenci6n de la reincidencia. El 6rgano com-
petente para la adjudicaci6n de la peligrosidad deberi apreciar al sujeto en toda
su personalidad teniendo en cuenta la acci6n, las motivaciones que lo conduje-
ron a la comisi6n de la acci6n, para constatar si el tratamiento resocializante
tendri 6xito a trav6s de la pena establecida por la ley o si es necesario someterlo
a una medida diversa.
En el caso contrario, se emitirian juicios sobre la conducta futura del
individuo inadecuados a la realidad, asisti6ndose a una disparidad de tratamiento
donde individuos con capacidad e instancias antisociales reducidas permanecen
sujetos a medidas sancionadoras por mis tiempo que otros que por su
predisposici6n a la conducta antisocial y por factores ambientales particulares
mantienen una actuacibn delictiva. 2 7
El problema no reside 6inicamente en el formular un juicio de peligrosidad
teniendo consideracibn de los indicios objetivos y subjetivos varios ni dando
prioridad a unos sobre otros. El principio de legalidad impone que la
determinacibn de la peligrosidad se base en indicios objetivos que sean, sin
embargo, conectados lo mis posible con la personalidad del individuo de modo
que entre los indicios dados por la norma (la cual prev6 abstracta y
objetivamente los indicios) y la conducta o comportamiento desplegados por el
autor del hecho (que ofrece la posibilidad de desunir indicios subjetivos que es
necesario confrontar con aqu6llos previstos por la norma) se establezca una
liason, haci6ndose en definitiva lo que provee el articulo 60 de nuestro c6digo
penal para la fijacibn de las penas.
El nficleo de la discusibn hasta ahora seguida se centra en otro problema: la
competencia del 6rgano adjudicador para emitir el juicio de peligrosidad.
El c6digo penal de Puerto Rico en sus articulos referentes a las medidas de
seguridad atribuye exclusivamente al juez la tarea de adjudicar especificamente
la peligrosidad segfin la presunci6n que el legislador ha establecido en la norma.
La peligrosidad en el derecho penal sirve como base a la imposici6n de medidas
privativas de libcrtad de la misma forma que la pena se basa en la determinaci6n
26 Misure di sicurezza nella esperienza italiana e argentina en A rchivio Penale, 1972,
p~ig. 18.
27 Ibid.
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de culpabilidad. No por ello se debe hacer equivalente el juicio de culpabilidad al
juicio de peligrosidad. En el juicio de culpabilidad, se deben tomar en
consideraci6n dos cosas: la imputabilidad y la comisi6n del hecho por la persona
que se juzga. Para dar la categoria de peligroso a un individuo basta la comisi6n
de una acci6n punible, independientemente de si el individuo fuera o no
imputable. El juicio de imputabilidad para la culpabilidad no ofrece dificultad
desde el punto de vista del tratamiento juridico cuando la prueba pericial
demuestra que el individuo cometib la acci6n a causa de enfermedad o defecto
mental, o sea, que el individuo al momento de la comisibn de la accion a causa
de enfermedad o defecto mental carecia de capacidad suficiente para compren-
der la criminalidad del acto o para conducirse de acuerdo con el mandato de ley,
segfin los requisitos del articulo 30 de nuestro c6digo penal. Basta con esta
determinaci6n para que el juez, basindose en la opini6n del perito psiquiatra,
declare a un individuo culpable o no y lo someta a una sanci6n penal. El juicio
de peligrosidad, sin embargo, va mis alli de la simple declaraci6n de
culpabilidad: la peligrosidad revela la probabilidad de reincidencia y no cambia el
juicio emitido por el perito sobre el estado animico del autor al momento de la
comisi6n de la accibn.
Vista la novedad del tema en el ordenamiento juridico penal puertorriquefio
y habiendo constatado la carencia de tratamiento de la materia en nuestra
literatura penal, nos referimos a la experiencia italiana fruto de 46 afios de
aplicaci6n en el campo de las medidas de seguridad con la esperanza que estas
experiencias positivas o negativas puedan servir de ejemplo que contribuya a una
exitosa aplicaci6n en nuestra legislacibn naciente.
En la prictica italiana el juez pronuncia el juicio de peligrosidad basfindose
en los argumentos formulados por el perito incluyendo en ia fbrmula con la cual
encarga al perito la determinacibn del estado mental para el juicio de
culpabilidad la siguiente frase: "Diga ademis si el individuo que se juzga es una
persona socialmente peligrosa." 2 8 Por tanto, el juez remite al perito aquella
decisi6n que por ley cometia a 61 en base, no ya de las consideraciones que la ley
le obligaba (el articulo 133 equivalente a nuestro 60) basando el juicio de
peligrosidad en los requisitos de la imputabilidad.
Hacemos nuestra en este momento ia preocupaci6n de Vassalli en el articulo
citado, observndolo desde un ingulo visual diferente al expresar que quizis el
juez no emite el juicio de peligrosidad porque no se reputa id6neo a hacerlo,
faltindole las disposiciones necesarias a las estructuras t6cnico-juridicas. No hay
duda sobre la competencia del juez en lo que respecta al anilisis cualitativo y
cuantitativo del delitO: la intensidad del dolo y el grado de la culpa y las
modalidades de la acci6n, circunstancias que respectan a la acci6n punible. La
28 Semerari c Citterio, op. cit., pig. 340.
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duda aparece por lo que respecta a las circunstancias pertinentes al autor,
circunstancias que el juez no podria evaluar por si mismo en trminos del estado
peligroso, ya que, en palabras de Hesnard 29 "la peligrosidad puede ser estudiada
y descubierta s6lo si el observador que debe ocuparse del sujeto logra obtener la
confianza de 6ste", confianza que ciertamente no lograria obtener el juez dada la
relaci6n meramente circunstancial que existe entre juez y acusado. Unicamente
mediante un contacto intimo con el sujeto en examen podri el adjudicador
reconstruir las circunstancias y motivos de la acci6n o acciones anteriores que
constituyen, como hemos ya visto, los primeros sintomas de peligrosidad.
Continfia diciendo Hesnard: "La peligrosidad se revela en la apreciaci6n de
posibles cambios aparentes en la personalidad del delincuente. Se entiende que 61
busca una posibilidad de situaci6n crimin6gena, realizando una especie de
selecci6n entre los acontecimientos y circunstancias de su ambiente actual, de
situaciones y de compafieros y de enemigos que los hacen recordar la antigua
situaci6n crimin6gena .... Existe [en 61] una fuerza de repetici6n que reproduce la
oportunidad de la reincidencia." 3 0 Todo lo hasta ahora dicho no significa mis
que lo siguiente: para determinar un eventual estado de peligrosidad es necesario
evaluar al individuo no s6lo relacionindolo con el hecho delictivo cometido sino
tambi6n con su actividad subsiguiente. Y esto en virtud de una observaci6n de
parte de individuos especializados que sepan recoger y clasificar aquellos
"posibles cambios aparentes de la personalidad", indicios de peligrosidad.
La norma que encamina el juicio de peligrosidad exige la determinaci6n de
ia forma de vida del individuo antecedente al delito. En este caso no nos
encontramos ante un pron6stico de conducta futura basado sobre la determina-
ci6n de un despliegue de conducta o comportamiento al momento de la
comisi6n de la accibn ni de un anilisis psicol6gico de la conducta post-factum,
sino de un anilisis de la historia del individuo desde su nacimiento, a trav6s de su
vida, hasta el momento de la comisi6n del hecho por el cual se le enjuicia. Un
anilisis a hacerse a travs de una pericia psicol6gica que, adems de que debe
hacerse por un juez especializado, retrasaria los procesos adjudicativos.
Analicemos otro pariimetro que nos da la norma en cuanto al caricter del
individuo. Como dice Leggeri 3 l basindose en la definicibn que de caricter da
Gemelli: "el todo dinimico que resulta de la estructura de los elementos
psiquicos individuales que explican la conducta humana", el caricter en
particular representa un elemento de investigacibn delicadisimo para la com-
prensibn del individuo y para la evaluaci6n de su conducta. Un diagnbstico de
peligrosidad basado finicamente en la norma o en el parecer de un perito, como
sucede en la jurisdiccibn italiana, o como proyectado por la legislaci6n
29 Op. Cit., pig. 243.
30 Ibid.
31 "Pericolositi sociale e norma giuridica" en Semerari, op. cit., pigs. 430-433.
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puertorriquefia que hace obligatoria la imposicibn de una medida de seguridad a
unas categorias especificas de delincuentes, cuyo resultado es etiquetar al
delincuente sin determinaci6n de peligrosidad con excepci6n del caso del
absuelto por incapacidad mental, no es exacta ni recomendable, sobre todo si se
deja en manos de un 6rgano incompetente.
La peligrosidad, como resulta del precedente orden de ideas, implica un
diagn6stico cientifico y para emitir un juicio ponderado que responda a las
finalidades de prevencikn general y especial de la medida de seguridad, el juez
necesita de una prueba cientifica que deberi consistir en una evaluaci6n de la
personalidad del individuo que se somete al juicio. Evaluaci6n que, como afirma
la Dra. Silving,3 2 habri de desembocar en una predicci6n de las actividades
delictivas que en t~rminos tipificados, el individuo podria desempefiar en el
futuro.
El juicio de peligrosidad se funda en un diagn6stico clinico muy particular:
no 6inicamente en la patologfa como en el caso de la pericia psiquiftrica, sino en
el conocimiento concreto de la personalidad y del comportamiento 6tico de
todos los delincuentes.
En conclusi6n, a diferencia del juicio de imputabilidad para la culpabilidad,
aunque fundado en los mismos datos ficticos, el juicio de peligrosidad esti
dirigido con mayor acentuacibn a individuar la presumible conducta futura del
individuo. Se exige en 61 a este objetivo, una mayor intensidad de investigaci6n,
una apreciacibn mis delicada.
La diferencia descansa entonces no ya en los elementos a tomar en
consideraci6n sino en el valor que habri de darse a los mismos ya sea al
momento de su adquisicibn (se asumen para un fin, la determinaci6n de
peligrosidad) que al momento de su evaluaci6n (se evalfan justamente para saber
si el individuo es peligroso): una diferencia que conduce, por cuanto hemos
dicho, a consecuencias notables por lo que respecta al hombre que se enjuicia.
No es dificil persuadirse, segfin lo que aqui se ha expuesto, que si en la
peligrosidad determinada por el juez, la evaluacibn no alcanzari james las
finalidades sociales que fundan su determinaci6n, mucho menos se lograrin a
trav6s del dictamen de una peligrosidad presunta por el legislador. Unicamente a
base de investigaciones Ilevadas a cabo con rigurosos m6todos cientificos
(psicologia experimental, sociologia clinica, exmnenes morfol6gicos y psiquii-
tricos) se puede contar para alcanzar la meta representada por el pronbstico
penal.
Se recomienda, por tanto, no una determinaci6n de peligrosidad hecha por
un juez con base en simples impresiones, adivinanzas o intuiciones en el ejercicio
32 Op. cit., pig. 301.
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de una discreci6n ilimitada, que hemos visto en la realidad prictica deleteria,
sino que abandonando la peligrosidad presunta por el legislador, junto
al juez, para hacer el diagn6stico de peligrosidad, desde nuestro punto de vista
deberia existir un equipo de t6cnicos especializados en las materias citadas que
tenga bajo observacibn al individuo durante el periodo que dura el juicio,
teniendo presente que la finalidad de este equipo no es aquella de sustituir al
juez al hacer el juicio de peligrosidad; lo que se busca y se quiere es poner a
disposicibn de los jueces instrumentos de trabajo. La selecci6n no es entre
brganos adjudicadores sino entre procedimientos de prueba basados uno en el rol
del juez y el otro en experiencias cientificas.
